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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Essays on Marketing Strategy 
by 
Chang Liu 
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019 
Associate Professor Baojun Jiang, Co-Chair 
Professor John Nachbar, Co-Chair 
In this dissertation, I apply game-theoretical methods in the context of marketing research and 
investigate the effects of stylized facts in behavioral economics. Chapter 1 studies the effects of 
managerial optimism on firms’ performance. Research has shown that many managers and 
entrepreneurs tend to be optimistic and are inclined to believe that negative shocks happen to them 
less frequently than to others. However, there is also evidence suggesting that such optimism is 
often inaccurate in reality and managerial optimism can lead to the failure of a company. We 
develop a game-theoretic model to investigate the impact of managerial optimism on firms’ 
performance in a competitive market. Our analysis shows that a manager’s optimism about 
demand can increase the firm’s profit. Moreover, only one firm having managerial optimism can 
be win-win for both firms in a duopoly, because it can increase the level of product quality 
differentiation between the firms, alleviating price competition. However, if both firms have 
optimistic managers, the benefit of increased differentiation disappears, and firms are weakly 
worse off, compared with the case of both firms having realistic managers. Our research suggests 




Chapter 2 studies the effects of different supply chains on firms’ profitability. In many supply 
chains, the downstream retailer designs product quality and decides retail price, but outsources the 
production to an upstream manufacturer. This practice is referred to as “contract manufacturing” 
(CM). Sometimes, in addition to production outsourcing, the retailer also outsources the design 
process to the manufacturer. This is referred to as “original design manufacturing” (ODM). This 
chapter compares these two different outsourcing practices and develops a game-theoretical model 
to investigate the effects of quality design outsourcing on quality level, price, and the profits of 
both the retailer and the manufacturer in a market with demand uncertainty. Our analysis reveals 
that in ODM, the product has lower quality level, lower wholesale price, and lower retail price 
than in CM. The retailer is better off with ODM when demand uncertainty is low, and better off 
with CM when demand uncertainty is high. Moreover, when demand uncertainty is high, the 
manufacturer’s profit may increase with demand uncertainty. In Chapter 3, using data from a 
Chinese textile manufacturer that supplies a major U.S. retailer, we estimate a logit model and 
demonstrate that, consistent with our prediction, the retailer is more likely to choose ODM and 
outsource quality design under low high demand uncertainty.
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Chapter 1  
Managerial Optimism in a Competitive 
Market 
 
Co-authored with Baojun Jiang 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurs and executives are often afflicted with optimistic bias, believing that negative events 
are less likely to happen to themselves than to others. A survey conducted by Cooper et al. (1988) 
found that entrepreneurs generally perceived the prospects of their businesses as favorable, with 
81% of the respondents seeing their odds of success as 7 out of 10 or better. More remarkably, 
33% of them believe that the probability of success is 100%. By contrast, their perceived odds of 
success are much lower for other businesses. Liang and Dunn (2010) suggest that optimism is 
positively correlated with other entrepreneurial characteristics, including independence, creativity 
and risk tolerance. Many scholars have argued that important business decisions, such as starting 
a new company, entering an existing market, making investments in new projects, or acquiring 
another firm, are often made under the influence of optimism (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991; Camerer 
and Lovallo, 1999; Dunne et al, 1988; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997).  
Sometimes even biased or “irrational optimism” is applauded among entrepreneurs and 
executives. In an interview with the New York Times, Shafqat Islam, the chief executive of the 
content-marketing platform called NewsCred, stressed the importance of irrational optimism: “I 
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feel like you need to be irrationally optimistic about barriers you can break through, or things you 
can get accomplished, or projects that you can deliver in a certain amount of time.”1 However, he 
also admitted that this philosophy has its tradeoffs, as it can make him “being way too aggressive, 
too ambitious.”  
While optimism is pervasive among entrepreneurs, it does not always deliver the best 
business results. According to Headd (2003), 50% of newly founded firms in the U.S. cease to 
exist within four years of startup. Frankish et al. (2010) report a similar four-year closure rate of 
53% for the UK. Half of the time, entrepreneurs’ optimistic perceptions of their businesses do not 
come true. Moreover, a report from Startup Genome suggests that most startup companies fail due 
to premature scaling as they built up capacities too early, i.e., biased beliefs about market demands 
can directly lead to a company’s failure.2 
Given that managerial optimism is not always beneficial to firms, one may wonder under 
what circumstances optimism is likely to benefit firms. Managerial optimism can be optimism 
about the manager’s own ability or about some external market conditions. This paper develops 
an analytical framework to study the latter type of managerial optimism. More specifically, we 
focus on analyzing how a manager’s optimism about market demand affects the firms’ product 
quality and pricing decisions. Moreover, we examine whether firms should hire realistic or 
optimistic managers in a competitive market. 
In our model, two competing firms produce products that are differentiated both horizontally 
and vertically. Each firm has a manager who chooses the quality level and price of its product. A 
realistic manager has an objective assessment of the market demand—the number of consumers 





that have high valuations for quality—whereas an optimistic manager has a biased belief about 
demand, believing the number of high-valuation consumers to be higher than it actually is. We 
also analyze several different types of managerial optimism in model extensions and show that our 
main insight remains robust. We address the following research questions. How does optimism 
affect a manager’s choice of quality and price? Can a firm make a higher profit with an optimistic 
manager than with a realistic manager? How does a manager’s optimism affect her competitor’s 
optimal pricing and quality decisions and its profit? 
Our analysis reveals the following main findings. First, we show that when one of the two 
firms has an optimistic manager, managerial optimism can make the firm better off. This is because 
even though the firm’s quality and price will be suboptimal conditional on the competitor’s quality 
and price choices, the manager’s optimism leads to her choosing higher quality and higher price 
than otherwise, which serves to increase the quality differentiation between the firms’ products 
and alleviate price competition. In essence, the benefit of the manager’s optimism comes partly 
from its role as a credible commitment to a higher-than-otherwise quality level and a higher-than-
otherwise price, which induces the competing firm to lower its quality and increase its price, 
alleviating competition in the market. 
Second, we find that under some conditions, one firm’s manager’s optimism can also make 
the competitor better off, because of alleviated price competition. That is, one firm having an 
optimistic manager can lead to a win-win outcome for both firms in equilibrium, in which both 
firms make higher profits than when they both have realistic managers. We also show in model 
extensions that this win-win outcome can occur regardless of whether product quality is 
endogenous, whether firms have a unit cost or a fixed cost of production, or whether the manager’s 
optimism is about consumers’ valuations for quality, the distribution of horizontal preferences, or 
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the quality level of her product. 
Third, we find that firms are weakly worse off when both of them hire optimistic managers, 
compared with the case in which both hire realistic managers. Bilateral optimism makes both firms 
choose higher quality and price in order to appeal to high-valuation consumers. As the symmetry 
of managerial optimism will no longer lead to an increase in quality differentiation between the 
firms’ products, both firms’ profits suffer from not targeting the low-valuation consumers in the 
market. Thus, although one firm’s managerial optimism can make both firms better off, two 
managers’ shared optimistic bias will not benefit any firm. This phenomenon may help to explain 
the extensive managerial failure caused by widespread entrepreneurial optimism.  
Lastly, we also study the effects of managerial pessimism, where a pessimistic manager 
believes the number of high-valuation consumers to be lower than it actually is. We find that 
although the effects of managerial optimism is ambiguous, a manager’s pessimism is always 
detrimental to her firm. Note that while optimism can serve as a commitment to charging a higher 
price and thus mitigate competition, pessimism makes managers choose a lower price, which 
exacerbates rather than alleviates competition, hence reducing the firm’s profit. However, when 
the optimistic manager and the pessimistic manager coexist, they can aim to target different 
segments of the market, and both of them can benefit from their differentiated biases. 
In Section 1.2, we review the related literature. Section 1.3 introduces the core model 
framework and discusses the benchmark case in which optimism does not exist. Section 1.4 
presents the main results. Section 1.5 extends our core model and checks the robustness of our 
results in some alternative settings. Section 1.6 concludes the paper with some discussions for 
future research. All proofs are provided in the Online Appendix. 
1.2 Literature Review 
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An extensive body of literature on entrepreneurial optimism explores both its causes and 
implications. Optimism often leads to people making biased decisions or assumptions. Fischhoff 
et al. (1977) demonstrate through experiments that people are often wrong when they are certain 
that they know the answer to a question. For questions covering a variety of topics, including 
history, music, geography, nature and literature, subjects were asked to choose the most likely 
answer and indicate the degree of certainty that their chosen answer was indeed correct. Answers 
assigned with a probability of 100% being correct were actually correct less than 30% of the time. 
However, subjects are sufficiently comfortable risking money on their judgements as they 
consistently overestimate their accuracy. Mahajan (1992) finds that such effects of overconfidence 
are even stronger when people are asked to make predictions pertaining to events inside their 
domain of expertise. 
As shown empirically by Cooper et al. (1988), entrepreneurs’ levels of optimism are not 
correlated with their personal backgrounds or the nature of their firms. In other words, it is not 
those who are more likely to succeed that are more optimistic. Entrepreneurs who are poorly 
prepared are just as optimistic as those who are well-prepared. Sharot et al. (2011) argue that 
people are more likely to update their beliefs in response to better-than-expected information and 
that unrealistic optimism is caused by diminished neural coding of undesirable information 
regarding the future. In an experimental study, Proeger and Meub (2013) find that even individual 
subjects with realistic confidence levels demonstrate a much higher level of overconfidence when 
they can observe other subjects’ decisions, which implies that overconfidence may be a social 
rather than an individual bias. 
Given that unrealistic optimism is pervasive among entrepreneurs, it is worth considering 
how it affects their business decisions and welfare. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) investigate the 
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effect of optimistic bias on firms’ entry decisions. Through an experimental approach, they argue 
that optimism is part of the explanation for excess entry and subsequent failure. Specifically, when 
subjects’ post-entry payoffs are based on the subjects’ skills measured by how many questions 
they answer correctly on a sample of 10 logic puzzles, rather than based on random processes, the 
subjects tend to overestimate their chance of success and enter the market more frequently. 
Koellinger et al. (2007) also show that entrepreneurial confidence is positively correlated with 
business creation and negatively correlated with approximate survival chances of their businesses.  
Managerial optimism plays an important role in innovation. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) show 
that CEOs who postpone the exercise of vested options in their firms, which is an indication of 
their optimism about the long-term performance of their firms, tend to invest more in innovation. 
They obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovation successes as a result 
of research and development expenditures, indicating that optimism may help CEOs exploit 
innovative growth opportunities.  
By contrast, Lowe and Ziedonis (2006) find that startup companies continue unsuccessful 
development efforts of innovative projects for longer periods of time than do established firms. 
Given that entrepreneurs of startups are more overoptimistic than managers of established firms, 
they argue that optimistic entrepreneurs may be in denial about the diminishing prospect of their 
innovations. Similarly, Simon and Houghton (2003) find managers’ overconfidence to be 
positively correlated with the riskiness of new product introduction, and negatively correlated with 
the likelihood of success of the new products. Simon and Shrader (2007) also find that optimistic 
overconfidence is positively related to introducing pioneering products and entering competitive 
markets. However, Herz et al. (2014) points out that while over-optimism—the tendency of 
individuals to overestimate their abilities or chances of success—is positively correlated with 
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innovative activities, judgmental overconfidence—the tendency of individuals to overestimate the 
precision of their information—is negatively associated with innovation. This result indicates that 
the two types of overconfidence bias should be treated separately. 
In financial markets, overconfidence of fund managers and traders lead to higher trade 
volumes and potential asset bubbles, as investors who think that they are above average in terms 
of making sound investments tend to trade more (Glacer and Weber, 2007; Statman et al, 2006; 
Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Odean, 1998). Moreover, overconfidence can partially explain 
volatility in financial markets, as Abbes (2013) argues that overconfidence bias contributed to the 
2008 financial crisis since volatility has been shown to be positively related to trading volume 
caused by overconfidence bias. 
Research has identified cases in which naïve optimism can be a strategic advantage. Johnson 
and Fowler (2011) argue that “believing you are better than you are in reality” can increase one’s 
payoff by making one more willing to engage in a competition, which is opposite to our analysis 
that managerial optimism can benefit a manager by mitigating competition. They show that 
overconfident players act aggressively in competition and are more likely to enter a contest over 
resources. Although sometimes they will lose contests due to their over-optimistic perception of 
their own ability, optimism is still beneficial as it not only allows them to exploit the cautiousness 
of their opponent and win the unclaimed resources, but also keeps them from walking away from 
conflicts that they could win. In their model, optimism benefits one player at the cost of her 
opponent, and never leads to a win-win outcome, which is in contrast to our prediction that both 
firms can benefit from one firm’s optimism. Similarly, Kyle and Wang (1997) show that in a 
duopoly model of informed speculation, overconfidence may strictly dominate rationality since an 
overconfident trader may not only generate higher expected profit and utility than his rational 
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opponent, but also higher profit than if he were also rational. In their model, overconfidence serves 
as a commitment device in a standard Cournot duopoly. As a result, the game may end up in a 
prisoner’s dilemma, as both funds select overconfident managers in equilibrium, lowering both 
funds’ profits. 
Given that managerial optimism does not always improve a firm’s profit, it may be puzzling 
why firms often hire optimistic executives. Goel and Thakor (2006) provide an explanation for 
why managers who overestimate their abilities are often promoted to become the CEO. In a two-
period model, they show that overconfident managers have higher probability of being promoted 
to second-period CEO than rational managers. While firms appoint the manager with highest 
perceived ability as the second-period CEO, overconfident managers—who are optimistic about 
the future—underestimate project risks and may achieve better results. Moreover, moderately 
overconfident managers generate higher profits than rational managers. de la Rosa (2011) proposes 
an alternative explanation: optimistic agents who overestimate the chance of success put in more 
effort and require lower success-contingent payments. Thus, taking moral hazard into 
consideration, firms may find it optimal to hire optimistic managers, since they work harder and 
require less monetary compensation. Hilary et al. (2016) confirms this theory by showing that 
empirically, over-optimistic managers exert great effort, which can improve firm’s welfare. 
Given that naïve optimism can be viewed as a lack of strategic capability, it is noteworthy 
that Zhou et al. (2015) show that less strategic players can earn more profits than strategic firms 
in oligopolistic competition. Specifically, strategic players may raise prices to capitalize on their 
loyal customers’ willingness to pay, and thus drive price-sensitive consumers to nonstrategic firms. 
With enough loyal customers, a strategic firm’s expected profit can be lower than a nonstrategic 
firm’s profit. Consequently, both firms can benefit from one firm’s naïveté. Similarly, Li et al. 
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(2017) find that the overconfident newsvendor, which believes the uncertain demand distribution 
to be less variable than it really is, may actually make a higher profit than its less biased competitor. 
This paper contributes to the literature on managerial optimism in multiple ways.3 First, the 
extant research on optimism mainly examines an agent’s optimism over her own ability, whereas 
we study a manager’s optimism about demand in the market, which has an uncertain proportion 
of consumers who have high valuations for the product. We show that the latter type of optimism 
of a manager can benefit both her own firm and its competitor, leading to a win-win outcome—a 
result that is different from the typical win-lose outcome (i.e., optimism can benefit a player at the 
cost of her opponents) shown in the existing literature.  
Second, we analyze the effects of optimism on firms’ optimal quality decisions as well as 
prices, whereas previous studies (e.g., Johnson and Fowler 2011, Zhou et al. 2015) mostly focus 
on firms’ entry decisions and price choices. We show that while optimism makes a manager 
increase product quality, it tends to induce her competitor to decrease product quality, increasing 
product differentiation and alleviating price competition in the market. 
Third, we also analyze equilibria of the game in which firms decide which type of managers 
to hire, and show that managerial optimism can be endogenously sustained in equilibrium. We 
provide suggestions to firms on when to choose optimistic managers. 
1.3 Model 
Let us consider a market with two competing firms, labeled 𝑎 and 𝑏, selling products that are 
differentiated both horizontally and vertically. Each firm 𝑖 ∈ {𝑎, 𝑏} sells one product, and each 
                                                 
3 In the literature, the terms “overconfidence” and “optimism” are sometimes used interchangeably. In this paper, 
similar to Herz et al. (2014), we define optimism as a decision maker’s overestimate of the market demand, and 
overconfidence as the decision maker’s overestimate the precision of her demand estimate. We focus on the former 
type of bias.  
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consumer buys at most one product, based on which product gives the consumer a higher positive 
utility. 
There is a unit mass of consumers in the market. Consumers are heterogeneous in terms of 
their willingness to pay for quality; there are two types of consumers, denoted by 𝑗 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}. Let 
𝜃𝑗  denote type-j consumer’s willingness to pay for quality, where 𝜃𝐿 < 𝜃𝐻 . Without loss of 
generality, we normalize 𝜃𝐻 to 1, so we have 0 < 𝜃𝐿 < 1. The consumer’s valuation for firm i’s 
product is 𝑞𝑖𝜃𝑗, where 𝑞𝑖 is the quality of firm i’s product. For example, the quality of a smartphone 
can be interpreted as a combination of its processor speed, storage capacity, screen resolution, and 
battery life. Product quality is a “vertical” attribute, in that all consumers have the same order of 
preferences if prices are the same.  Let 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) denote the fraction of consumers having high 
valuations for quality, and 1 − 𝛼 the fraction of consumers having low valuations. 
Consumers can also have different taste or horizontal preferences. We assume that 
consumers’ horizontal preferences are uncorrelated with their valuations for quality and are 
uniformly distributed on the line segment between zero and one. In this horizontal preference 
dimension, firm 𝑎 is located at 0 and firm 𝑏 at 1. So, a consumer’s net utility from firm 𝑖’s product 
is 𝑈(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑞𝑖𝜃𝑗 − 𝑡𝑑𝑖(𝑥) − 𝑝𝑖, where 𝑥 represents the ideal location of the consumer’s horizontal 
preference, 𝑑𝑖(𝑥) is the horizontal mismatch between the firm and the consumer’s ideal horizontal 
preference, 𝑡 > 0 is the consumers’ sensitivity to horizontal mismatch, and 𝑝𝑖 is firm 𝑖’s price. 
Each consumer will buy the product that gives her the highest non-negative utility, or choose the 
outside option, whose utility is normalized to zero. 
Firm i’s unit cost of producing one unit of the product of quality 𝑞𝑖 is 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑘𝑞𝑖
2, where 𝑘 >
0; that is, for a higher-quality product, each unit will cost more to produce. Any fixed cost of 




Each firm is managed by a manager, who makes the pricing and quality decisions for the firm. 
There are two types of managers: the “realistic” type and the “optimistic” type. The manager’s 
goal is to maximize her firm’s profit based on her belief about the competition and the market. In 
other words, we implicitly assume that the manager is compensated based on a fraction of the 
firm’s profit, so there is no moral hazard in our model. When making product quality and pricing 
decisions, the managers may not know the true 𝛼. The realistic manager has an unbiased belief 
about 𝛼, whereas the optimistic manager is biased and believes that the fraction of high-valuation 
consumers is ?̂?, where  ?̂? ∈ (𝛼, 1].4 We first investigate the boundary case in which  ?̂? = 1, i.e. an 
optimistic manager believes that all consumers have high willingness-to-pay for quality. We relax 
this assumption in a later extension and show that our results are qualitatively the same when ?̂? ∈
(𝛼, 1). 
Each manager’s type is common knowledge. That is, an optimistic manager knows that her 
perceived fraction of high-valuation consumers is larger than that of a realistic manager, and vice 
versa. Note that even though an optimistic manager knows that she has a different belief about 𝛼 
than a realistic manager, she does not know or think that her belief is biased, and thus her profit-
maximization decisions are based on her own belief and her knowledge that the realistic manager 
has a different belief about the market. This is a reasonable assumption since oftentimes decision 
makers with biased beliefs do not think they are biased even though they know that they have 
different beliefs than others. 
The game has three stages. In the first stage, managers, with their respective beliefs about 𝛼, 
simultaneously choose their quality levels. In the second stage, having observed each other’s 
                                                 
4 Note that we have used the term “belief” to describe the managers’ knowledge about 𝛼. In a more general model, 
the belief may not be singleton, but in our stylized model, the manager’s belief is just one specific value (rather than 
a distribution), i.e., the manager knows or expects the fraction of high-valuation consumers to be a specific value. 
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quality choices, the managers simultaneously choose their respective prices. In the third stage, 
consumers make purchase decisions, firms’ profits are realized, and the true 𝛼 is thereby revealed.  
Benchmark: No Optimism 
First, we analyze the benchmark case in which both firms have realistic managers. We focus on 
the case i.e. the parameter region in which with no optimism the market is fully covered in 
equilibrium, i.e., in equilibrium all consumers in both quality-valuation segments will buy a 
product. We will study how optimism might change the market coverage in the next section. 
We solve for the equilibrium outcome by backward induction. In the last stage of the game, 
the type-j consumer who is indifferent between the firms’ products has a horizontal preference (or 









, where “ −𝑖 ” indicates the competitor of firm 𝑖 , and 𝜃 ≡ 𝛼𝜃𝐻 +
(1 − 𝛼)𝜃𝐿 = 𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜃𝐿 , where 𝜃𝐻 = 1 . Note that 𝜃  represents the consumers’ average 
valuation for quality and we can use 𝜃 in this expression due to linearity of the demand function. 
The equilibrium price is easily derived: 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑡 +
1
3




















. The manager of each firm chooses its quality to maximize its expected profit, and we can 









≥ 1𝑖 . Since a high-
valuation consumer always has a higher utility than a low-valuation consumer with the same 
13 
 
horizontal preference, the high-valuation segment will always be fully covered if the low-valuation 





≥ 1𝑖  is binding in equilibrium. One can readily 
determine the parameter conditions of full market coverage in the benchmark case, which is given 
in Lemma 1, together with the equilibrium outcome. 
LEMMA 1. When both firms have realistic managers, the market is fully covered in equilibrium 
if 𝜃𝐿
2 − 𝛼2(1 − 𝜃𝐿)


















Note that the equilibrium is unique and symmetric. This is true as long as 𝑡 > 0. Lemma 1 
shows that the market is fully covered in equilibrium when the low-type consumer’s willingness-
to-pay for quality is high enough (i.e., 𝜃𝐿  is above some threshold), or alternatively when the 
consumer’s sensitivity (𝑡) to horizontal mismatch is relatively low, or the fraction (𝛼) of high-
valuation consumers is low. For the remainder of this paper, we will assume the condition specified 
in Lemma 1. 
1.4 Analysis with Optimism 
In this section, we first analyze the case in which only one firm has an optimistic manager, who 
perceives the market to have more high-valuation consumers than it does. We investigate the 
effects of managerial optimism on each firm’s optimal product quality, price, and profit. Again, 
we solve for the equilibrium outcome by backward induction. Without loss of generality, we 
assume that firm 𝑎’s manager is optimistic and firm 𝑏’s manager is realistic. 
Even though the market is fully covered in the case without optimism, it may not always be 
fully covered in equilibrium when a firm’s manager is optimistic. We will analyze both the full-
coverage and the partial-coverage scenarios. 
14 
 
Recall that in this part, we focus on the case in which the optimistic manager’s bias is the 
strongest and assume ?̂? = 1, i.e. she believes that all consumers have high valuation for quality. 
In the extension, we will show that when ?̂? < 1, our results are qualitatively the same. When both 
the high-valuation and the low-valuation segments are fully covered under optimism, firm 𝑎’s 









, where 𝜃𝐻 = 1 . When the low-valuation segment is not fully 








). Since firm 𝑎’s manager believes that all consumers have high valuations, she still 




. Lemma 2 gives the conditions under which the 
market is fully covered in equilibrium under unilateral optimism. 
LEMMA 2. When firm a has an optimistic manager and firm b has a realistic manager, the 
market is fully covered in equilibrium if  
−(11 − 20𝛼 + 11𝛼2) + 2(11 − 20𝛼 + 11𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 − (9 − 20𝛼 + 11𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2 ≥ 12𝑘𝑡.   
                                                 
5 Note that in this paper we have focused on the parameter region where the market is fully covered in equilibrium of 
the benchmark case. One can show that in that parameter region, under unilateral optimism, the high-valuation 
segment is always fully covered (please see the proof of Lemma 2 in the Online Appendix for details). So, here we 
only need to consider two cases: both segments are fully covered, or the high-valuation segment is fully covered but 




Figure 1.1  Effect of Managerial Optimism on Market Coverage6 
When one firm has an optimistic manager, the market will in equilibrium be fully covered if 
𝜃𝐿 is relatively large, or if consumers’ sensitivity (𝑡) to horizontal mismatch is low. However, the 
effect of the number of high-valuation consumers is non-monotonic: the left-hand side (LHS) of 
the inequality in Lemma 2 increases with 𝛼  when 𝛼 <
10
11




Hence, Lemma 2 says that the fraction of high-valuation consumers must be neither too large nor 
too small for both segments to be fully covered. When 𝛼  is very high, there are not many 
consumers in the low-valuation segment, so even the realistic manager will ignore them and set 
the high price to target only high-valuation consumers. When 𝛼 is very low, the equilibrium price 
in the benchmark case is low, so the increase of 𝑝𝑎
∗  with optimism is large, and the low-valuation 
consumers located close to 0 may not be served, as they find firm 𝑎’s product too expensive and 
                                                 




①: Partial coverage without optimism 
②: Full coverage with and without 
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firm 𝑏’s too far from their ideal horizontal preferences. Figure 1.1 illustrates the equilibrium 
market coverage. We will analyze both the full-coverage and the partial-coverage scenarios to 
determine the effects of managerial optimism. 
1.4.1 Effect of Optimism on Managers’ Quality and Price Decisions 
Solving the game by backward induction, we can obtain the equilibrium outcome, which is 
provided in the Online Appendix. Our analysis shows that when one firm’s manager is optimistic, 
both firms will choose a different quality level from their optimal quality in the benchmark case. 
PROPOSITION 1. When firm a has an optimistic manager and firm b has a realistic manager, 
in equilibrium, firm a’s quality increases and firm b’s quality decreases relative to the benchmark 
case. 
As shown in Proposition 1, firm 𝑎 will choose higher quality than it does in the benchmark 
case, since its manager believes that all consumers have high valuations for quality whereas only 
𝛼 of the consumers have high valuations in the benchmark case. By contrast, firm 𝑏’s realistic 
manager will in equilibrium reduce its product quality to better serve the low-valuation consumers.  
PROPOSITION 2. When firm a has an optimistic manager and firm b has a realistic manager, 
in equilibrium, firm a’s price will increase and firm b’s price may either increase or decrease, 
relative to when both firms have realistic managers. 
Given that firm 𝑎 ’s managerial optimism increases firm 𝑎 ’s quality and lowers its 
competitor’s quality, one may intuit that managerial optimism will also induce firm 𝑎 to choose a 
higher price and firm b to choose a lower price than their respective price in the benchmark case 
(where both firms have realistic managers). However, this intuition may not be true. Although an 
optimistic manager will choose a high price to exploit the higher willingness-to-pay of high-
valuation consumers, managerial optimism can have two effects on firm 𝑏’s price. On one hand, 
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firm 𝑏 will reduce its quality due to firm a’s optimism, which tends to put downward pressure on 
its price. On the other hand, firm a’s optimism can alleviate price competition between the two 
firms, which can induce firms to raise prices. Depending on which effect dominates, 𝑝𝑏
∗  may either 
increase or decrease. 
Specifically, both firms’ prices will increase when 𝑡 is low, i.e. when consumers’ horizontal 
preferences are not very strong. Note that when 𝑡  is low, the level of product horizontal 
differentiation between firm 𝑎 and firm 𝑏 is low, and price competition is fierce in the benchmark 
case where there is no vertical differentiation. Under the influence of managerial optimism, firm 
𝑎’s manager will choose higher quality and price, which alleviates price competition in the market, 
compared with the intense competition in the benchmark case. As a result, both 𝑝𝑎
∗  and 𝑝𝑏
∗  will 





Figure 1.2  Effect of Managerial Optimism on Prices 
The effects of 𝛼 and 𝜃𝐿 on equilibrium prices are less straightforward. As depicted in Figure 
1.2, both firms’ prices increase when 𝛼 is high and 𝜃𝐿 is neither too high nor too low. When the 
fraction (𝛼) of high-valuation consumers is large, the realistic manager of firm 𝑏, though having 
unbiased beliefs about the market, will charge a price higher than that in the benchmark case, as 
she knows that there are sufficiently many high-valuation consumers who will buy the product. 
On the other hand, firm 𝑏 mainly serves the low-valuation consumers, and will raise its price only 
if 𝜃𝐿 is high enough such that the low-valuation consumers will accept the increased price, but not 
too high as to make too many consumers switch to firm 𝑎’s high-quality product. Consequently, 
when 𝛼 is high and 𝜃𝐿 is moderate, both firms’ prices will increase relative to the benchmark case. 
1.4.2 Effect of Optimism on Firms’ Profits 
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Given the equilibrium quality levels and prices, we can calculate both firms’ equilibrium profits 
under unilateral optimism. 
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that firm a’s manager is optimistic and firm b’s manager is realistic. 
There exists 𝑡∗ = 𝑓( 𝜃𝐿 , 𝛼, 𝑘) such that if 𝑡 < 𝑡
∗, both firms make higher profits than when both 
firms have realistic managers.  
Figure 1.3 illustrates the effects of unilateral optimism on the firms’ profits (relative to the 
benchmark of both firms having realistic managers). Note that in region 1, both firms can benefit 
from the optimism of firm 𝑎’s manager. The underlying reason why unilateral optimism can 
benefit both firms lies in the effect of optimism on the managers’ quality decisions. While both 
firms’ (realistic) managers choose the same equilibrium quality and price in the benchmark case, 
if firm 𝑎 is the only firm having an optimistic manager, firm 𝑎’s quality will increase whereas firm 
𝑏 ’s quality will decrease. That is, unilateral optimism will increase the level of vertical 
differentiation between the firms’ products, alleviating price competition in the market, which can 
under some conditions (in the shaded regions in Figure 1.3) make both firms de facto “local 
monopolists” to the low-valuation consumers (𝜃𝐿), resulting in partial equilibrium coverage in that 
consumer segment. This is particularly beneficial to firm 𝑏, since it mainly targets low-valuation 
consumers by choosing lower quality and price than firm 𝑎. So, within the shaded parameter 
region, firm 𝑏 tends to be better off when the willingness-to-pay of low-valuation consumers is 




Figure 1.3  Effect of Managerial Optimism on Profits8 
As for firm 𝑎, its product quality is higher than that of the competitor and it aims to target 
mainly the high-valuation consumers. When the willingness-to-pay of high-valuation consumers 
is high (i.e., 𝜃𝐿  is relatively low), firm 𝑎  will also benefit from its manager’s optimism. 
Consequently, both firms will earn higher expected profits under unilateral optimism when 𝜃𝐿 is 
neither too high nor too low (i.e., in region 1 in Figure 1.3). 
Note that this win-win outcome can occur only if the consumer’s sensitivity to horizontal 
mismatch is relatively weak (i.e., 𝑡 < 𝑡∗ ). Essentially, if 𝑡  is low, the level of horizontal 
differentiation is small and the competition is therefore fierce in the benchmark case (in which 
both firms have realistic managers). As unilateral optimism introduces a higher level of vertical 
differentiation compared with the benchmark case, competition will be largely alleviated, 
benefiting both firms and making a win-win outcome more likely. To summarize, although 
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optimism gives the manager biased beliefs about the market (𝛼) and leads to biased decisions about 
product quality and price, it can also mitigate competition since the optimistic manager will choose 
a higher quality and higher price than otherwise. When the alleviation of competition is significant 
enough, both firms can benefit from unilateral optimism. 
1.4.3 Endogenous Optimism and Firms’ Hiring Decisions 
We have so far assumed that a firm’s manager’s type is exogenous. In practice, firms may choose 
which type of manager—optimistic or realistic—to hire. In this section, we extend our model to 
allow firms to choose the type of managers to hire; we will analyze firms’ optimal hiring decisions. 
Let 𝑅 and 𝑂 denote the type of the realistic and the optimistic manager, respectively. Again, a 
manager’s type is common knowledge, and the manager will maximize her firm’s profit based on 
her belief. 
The new game has four stages. In the first stage, the two firms, 𝑎 and 𝑏, with unbiased 
knowledge of 𝛼, decide which types of managers to hire. This process can be interpreted as each 
firm’s board of directors’ selecting its CEO. We assume that both firms (i.e., their boards of 
directors) have unbiased realistic perception of the market. Each firm’s board will maximize the 
firm’s expected profit by choosing which type of manager to hire. In the second stage, the hired 
managers, with their respective beliefs about 𝛼, simultaneously choose their product quality. In 
the third stage, the managers simultaneously choose the prices for their products. In the final stage, 
consumers make purchase decisions, firms’ profits are realized, and the true 𝛼 is thereby revealed. 
There are four possible pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes in the first stage of the game: 
(𝑅, 𝑅), (𝑂, 𝑅), (𝑅, 𝑂), and (𝑂, 𝑂), where the first letter denotes the type of firm 𝑎’s manager and 
the second letter denotes the type of firm 𝑏’s manager. We start our analysis by examining the 
(𝑂, 𝑂) outcome, i.e. when both firms hire optimistic managers. 
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PROPOSITION 4. When both firms have optimistic managers, both firms will make an expected 
profit that is less than or equal to their respective profit in the benchmark case (with both having 
realistic managers). 
When both firms’ managers are optimistic, they will increase their product quality and prices. 
This bilateral optimism does not increase the (quality) differentiation between the two firms’ 
products, and hence will not help alleviate price competition. As a result, neither firm will benefit 
from this bilateral optimism. Moreover, under bilateral optimism, if both firms increase their prices 
to a level at which some low-valuation consumers would no longer purchase any product, both 
firms would be worse off. Proposition 4 shows that if both firms hire optimistic managers, firms 
can both end up worse off than if they both hire realistic managers. 
Further analysis reveals that (𝑂, 𝑂) cannot be an equilibrium outcome (please refer to the 
Online Appendix for details). Under the condition specified in the proof of Proposition 3 (𝑡 < 𝑡𝑎
∗), 
the asymmetric equilibrium of (𝑂, 𝑅) or (𝑅, 𝑂) will be the equilibrium outcome, i.e., one firm 
hires an optimistic manager and the other hires a realistic manager.9 Otherwise,  (𝑅, 𝑅) is the 
unique equilibrium outcome. 
In summary, only (𝑅, 𝑅), (𝑅, 𝑂), and (𝑂, 𝑅) equilibrium outcomes can exist. When optimism 
makes a firm worse off, both firms will hire realistic managers. When optimism is beneficial, only 
one firm will hire an optimistic manager. Both firms hiring optimistic managers is not an 
equilibrium, because one firm can always improve its profit by switching to a realistic manager. 
This final scenario provides an important suggestion regarding the firms’ hiring decisions. Our 
                                                 
9 One can interpret the equilibrium of (𝑂, 𝑅) and (𝑅, 𝑂) as the outcome of a different model setting where the firms’ 
managers have heterogeneous beliefs about market demand (i.e., one manager has higher belief about 𝛼 while the 
other has lower belief) and they rationally choose not to ensure the accuracy of their beliefs, even if it is costless to do 
so, before they make quality and pricing decisions. In the corresponding parameter region for that setting, optimistic 
bias can be endogenously sustained in equilibrium (i.e., the manager with the higher belief will rationally stay 
optimistic). We thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment. 
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analysis shows that even though an optimistic manager has a biased belief about the market, having 
an optimistic manager can be advantageous to the firm if its competitor’s manager is realistic. This 
is because, anticipating the optimistic manager’s quality and pricing decision, the unbiased 
manager will rationally reduce its product quality, which can be beneficial to the firm with the 
optimistic manager. However, if both firms are run by optimistic managers, their shared optimism 
does not benefit any firm. So, our result suggests that a firm should hire a realistic manager when 
managerial optimism is already pervasive in the market.10 
1.5 Extensions 
1.5.1 The Case of Exogenous Quality under Optimism 
Note that since managers choose prices after their quality decisions, managerial optimism can 
affect a firm’s price in two ways. First, it can directly change a manager’s price choice through 
changing her belief on the fraction of high-valuation consumers. Second, optimism can influence 
the manager’s pricing decision indirectly, through its effect on her choice of product quality. This 
leads to ambiguous effects of managerial optimism on prices, as shown in Proposition 2. Thus, in 
order to separate the direct effect of managerial optimism on price from its indirect effect, we now 
take product quality as exogenously given, and check the robustness of our results. 
When product quality is exogenously given, the game will have only two stages. First, 
managers, with their respective beliefs about 𝛼, simultaneously choose prices for their products. 
Second, consumers make purchase decisions, firms’ profits are realized, and the true 𝛼 is thereby 
revealed. Since firm 𝑎 is assumed to have an optimistic manager, she will maximize 𝜋𝑎 = (𝑝𝑎 −
                                                 
10 Note that even if it is more costly to hire realistic managers, as long as the additional cost is small enough (lower 
than the loss from hiring an optimistic manager), a firm should still hire a realistic manager. The additional cost does 












, where 𝜃 ≡ 𝛼𝜃𝐻 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜃𝐿  and 𝜃𝐻 = 1. For details of the analysis, 
please see the Online Appendix. 
Our analysis reveals that even if quality levels are exogenously given, under some 
circumstances, managerial optimism may still mitigate price competition and in turn increase both 
firms’ profits. Specifically, when 𝑞𝑎 > 𝑞𝑏 , firm 𝑎  mainly serves the high-valuation segment 
consumers since its quality advantage results in a larger advantage in valuation among high-
valuation consumers. In this case, if firm 𝑎’s manager believes that all consumers have high 
valuation for quality, she will increase firm 𝑎’s price to exploit its advantage, and the realistic 
manager of firm 𝑏  anticipates this and will also increase her price. Price competition is thus 
mitigated and both firms’ prices increase under optimism, making a win-win outcome possible. 
As firm 𝑎 mainly serves high-valuation consumers while firm 𝑏 mainly serves low-valuation 
ones, to have a win-win outcome in equilibrium, it is also necessary for both market segments to 
be lucrative. When 𝛼 is large, the number of high-valuation consumers is large, which benefits 
firm 𝑎. When 𝜃𝐿 is large, low-valuation consumers’ willingness to pay is high, which benefits firm 
𝑏. As a result, one manager’s optimism can benefit both firms if 𝛼 and 𝜃𝐿 are both high. 
1.5.2 The Case of Fixed Cost for Quality  
In our main analysis, we have assumed that, to produce products of higher quality, a firm has 
to incur a higher unit cost. This assumption fits well the case of tangible goods. For example, in 
the smartphone context, this means that a firm has to incur a higher unit cost when producing a 
higher quality smartphone (e.g., with a faster processor or a higher resolution display). By contrast, 
when a firm produces and sells intangible or digital products, its fixed cost will likely be much 
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more prominent than its unit cost. For example, a software firm may have to incur a higher R&D 
cost in order to develop a software with a higher quality, but after the product is developed, there 
is typically not much additional cost to deliver the software to an incremental customer. To capture 
the case of intangible goods, we study an alternative model in which firms incur fixed costs rather 
than unit costs to produce the products. 
In this model, we assume that to produce a product of quality 𝑞𝑖, firm 𝑖 has to incur a one-
time fixed cost 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑘𝑞𝑖
2, which can be interpreted as the R&D cost to design and develop the 
product. In order to focus on the effects of fixed costs on firms’ quality and pricing decisions, we 
assume that the unit cost is zero in this case. Consumers’ utility functions are as given before; firm 
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As in the core model, the manager of firm 𝑎 is assumed to be optimistic and believes that the 
market has a high fraction of high-valuation consumers (i.e. ?̂? = 1). Our analysis reveals that, 
similar to the case with unit cost, the optimistic manager chooses higher quality and price than the 
realistic manager, and both firms may earn higher profits. The intuition is the same: although 
managerial optimism entails biased perception of the market and induces the manager to make 
biased quality and pricing decisions, it can also increase the level of vertical differentiation and 
serve as a commitment to charging a higher price, which can alleviate competition and benefit 
both firms. So, we have shown that managerial optimism can lead to a win-win outcome even for 
the case of digital goods (with fixed costs for quality and negligible unit cost of production). 
1.5.3 Optimism over Consumers’ Willingness-To-Pay 
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In our core model, we have assumed that the optimistic manager overestimates the fraction 
of high-valuation consumers. In practice, optimistic bias may also come from a manager’s 
overestimation of consumers’ willingness-to-pay for the firm’s product. In this section, we analyze 
a model in which the optimistic manager believes that consumers have higher product valuations 
than believed by the realistic (i.e. unbiased) manager. 
There is a unit mass of consumers in the market. Buying firm i’s product gives a consumer 
utility 𝑈(𝑖) = 𝑞𝑖𝜃𝑗 − 𝑡𝑑𝑖(𝑥) − 𝑝𝑖 , where 𝜃𝑗 ∈ {𝜃𝐻 , 𝜃𝐿} is the consumer’s willingness-to-pay for 
quality, and other notations are the same as in the benchmark case.  As in the benchmark case, we 
normalize 𝜃𝐻 = 1 and assume 0 < 𝜃𝐿 < 1. While the realistic manager has an objective belief 
about both 𝜃𝐻  and 𝜃𝐿 , the optimistic manager overestimates the high-valuation consumers’ 
willingness-to-pay for quality and has a biased belief 𝜃𝐻 > 𝜃𝐻 = 1. To focus on the bias about the 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay, we assume that both managers know the fraction of high-valuation 
consumers. 
Under these assumptions, we find that our main result is robust; one manager’s optimism 
about consumers’ willingness-to-pay can make both firms better off. Moreover, the win-win 
outcome can occur as long as the optimistic manager’s belief (𝜃𝐻) is not too high. Otherwise, the 
optimistic manager will charge so high a price that very few consumers will buy her firm’s product, 
hence decreasing her profit. As a result, the win-win outcome can be achieved only when firm 𝑎’s 
manager’s optimistic bias is not too strong. 
1.5.4 Optimism over Consumers’ Horizontal Preference 
An optimistic manager may also have a biased belief about the distribution of the consumers’ 
horizontal preferences (taste) for the firm’s product. More specifically, in our model framework, 
an optimistic manager may believe consumers to be more densely populated close to her firm’s 
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location on the Hotelling line. Note that in this case, the manager’s biased belief about consumers’ 
taste preferences has asymmetric effects on the two firms. In this section, we analyze such a model 
and show that similar results and insights will manifest. 
Again, we assume that the manager of firm 𝑎  is optimistic. Consumers are uniformly 
distributed on interval [0,1], and firm 𝑎  and firm 𝑏  are located at 0 and 1, respectively. The 
optimistic manager believes that the probability density function of consumer distribution is 
𝐹(𝑥) = 2(1 − 𝑥), rather than the uniform distribution. That is, the optimistic manager has a biased 
belief that consumers are distributed in her firm’s favor and she has a competitive advantage, 
whereas the realistic manager of firm 𝑏 has an objective (unbiased) belief about the distribution of 
the consumers’ horizontal preferences. Note that we analyze only one specific example of the 
biased belief about the consumer distribution, to show that the win-win outcome from the main 
model can still occur. 
Given that managerial optimism is about the consumers’ horizontal preferences, we assume 
that all consumers have the same valuations (𝜃) for quality and that the market is fully covered in 
equilibrium. Similar to the core model, in this extension, if both firms have realistic managers, 
both firms will in equilibrium have the same quality, price, and expected profit. Proposition 5 
shows the effects of this new type of managerial optimism. 
PROPOSITION 5. In equilibrium, when firm a’s manager is optimistic about consumers’ 
horizontal preferences and firm b’s manager is realistic, both firms’ quality will remain 
unchanged, and both firms’ prices and profits will increase. 
As this type of managerial optimism does not concern the consumers’ valuation for quality 
and there is no heterogeneity in the consumer’s valuation for quality, it does not influence firms’ 
optimal quality choices, and the level of vertical differentiation does not change in this case. 
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However, both firms can be better off because optimism can help mitigate price competition. 
While the manager of firm 𝑎 believes that consumers are more densely located close to her, she 
finds it optimal to charge a higher price to extract more surplus from the loyal consumers, and 
forgo some consumers who find her product less horizontally matched. Knowing that firm 𝑎 will 
increase its price, firm 𝑏’s realistic manager will also choose a price higher than that in the 
benchmark case, but lower than firm 𝑎’s price, so that it can extract higher surplus while under-
cutting firm 𝑎 to acquire more of its customers. Therefore, when one manager is optimistic about 
the horizontal distribution of consumers, managerial optimism can still serve as a commitment for 
the manager’s choosing a higher price, which can alleviate price competition and benefit both 
firms. In this case, alleviated price competition allows the firm with an optimistic manager to make 
more profits (than the benchmark case) by charging a higher unit profit margin without losing too 
many customers, and the firm with a realistic manager will benefit because her equilibrium unit 
profit margin and market share will both increase relative to the benchmark case. 
1.5.5 Optimism over Quality Level  
In reality, managerial optimism may also be about a firm’s own product quality as perceived 
by consumers. That is, an optimistic manager may overestimate the customers’ perception of the 
quality of her product; in other words, the optimistic manager believes that consumers consider 
her product’s quality to be higher than its objective quality (e.g. due to the manager’s overestimate 
of her firm’s positive brand perception). As before, we assume that the manager of firm 𝑎 is 
optimistic and that of firm 𝑏 is realistic. The objective (or true) quality level of firm 𝑎 is 𝑞𝑎, but 
its manager overestimates that quality level, perceiving it to be ?̂?𝑎 = (1 + 𝛿)𝑞𝑎 to consumers, 
where 𝛿 > 0. The optimistic manager is assumed to not overestimate her competitor’s product 
quality, which is 𝑞𝑏. Firm 𝑏’s manager, being realistic, has an unbiased belief about both 𝑞𝑎 and 
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𝑞𝑏. Other aspects of the model are the same. 
Our analysis shows that when a manager is optimistic about the quality of her product, her 
optimistic bias can make both firms better off. In other words, our main result from the core model 
is robust in this alternative model. Specifically, we find that in this setting, both managers increase 
their prices under unilateral optimism, alleviating price competition and thus benefiting both firms. 
However, this win-win outcome can occur only if the optimistic bias is not too strong, i.e. 𝛿 not 
too large, so that the optimistic manager can enjoy the benefit of mitigated competition without 
having to suffer too severe a consequence from biased decisions on quality and price. 
1.5.6 Moderate Optimism 
Our core model has assumed that the optimistic manager believes that all consumers have 
high valuation, i.e. ?̂? = 1. Managerial optimism may take a more moderate form as well; for 
example, an optimistic manager may know the existence of low-valuation consumers but 
underestimate the size of that segment of consumers. In this model extension, we relax the 
assumption of extreme optimism (?̂? = 1) and consider ?̂? ∈ (𝛼, 1), i.e. the optimistic manager’s 
perceived fraction of high-valuation consumers can take any value between the true fraction (𝛼) 
and 1. In Figure 1.4, we compare the parameter regions in which unilateral optimism makes both 
firms better off (relative to no optimism) for  ?̂? = 1 versus ?̂? = 0.8. Note that in the case of ?̂? =
0.8, the meaningful range of 𝛼 in Figure 1.4 is only 𝛼 < 0.8 since by definition optimism means 
?̂? > 𝛼. 
As shown in Figure 1.4, when ?̂? < 1, moderate unilateral optimism can still lead to a win-
win outcome—both firms can make higher profits than in the benchmark case. Moreover, when 
?̂? < 1, this win-win equilibrium is more likely to occur, since when ?̂? = 1, firm 𝑎 will be worse 
off if the low-valuation consumer’s willingness-to-pay for quality is low (region 3 in Figure 1.4), 
30 
 
but when ?̂? = 0.8, both firms can be better off. This is because when managerial optimism is 
strong, the increase of firm 𝑎’s equilibrium price compared with that in the benchmark case is 
large, and its profit will suffer if low-valuation consumers do not have high enough willingness-
to-pay. By contrast, when managerial optimism is moderate, the price increase by firm 𝑎 is small. 
Even if 𝜃𝐿  is low (region 3), many low-valuation consumers are still willing to buy firm 𝑎’s 
product, so that both firms can in equilibrium benefit from the optimism of firm 𝑎’s manager. 
 
Figure 1.4  Effect of the Degree of Managerial Optimism11 
Figure 1.5 also demonstrates similar results. For a given number of high-valuation consumers 
(𝛼 = 0.5), as the perceived number by the optimistic manager (?̂?) increases, the parameter region 
in which both firms are better off tends to shrink, which is consistent with the fact that when 
managerial optimism is moderate, a win-win equilibrium outcome is more likely to occur. 
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Therefore, our results from the core model are qualitatively the same even when the degree of 
managerial optimism is not extreme. 
 
Figure 1.5  Effect of Moderate Managerial Optimism12 
1.5.7 Managerial Pessimism 
Given that evidence shows that managers and entrepreneurs tend to be optimistic, we have 
focused our study on identifying the effects of managerial optimism. However, under certain 
circumstances, such as during economic recessions, managerial pessimism might also become 
pervasive among managers. In this section, we investigate the effects of managerial pessimism. 
We first investigate the scenario in which one manager is realistic and the other is pessimistic. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that firm 𝑎’s manager is realistic and firm 𝑏’s manager is 
pessimistic. Recall that there is a unit mass of consumers and the fraction of consumers with high 
                                                 
12 This figure is drawn with 𝛼 = 0.5, 𝑘 = 0.1 and 𝑡 = 0.1. 
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valuations for quality is 𝛼 and that with low valuations is 1 − 𝛼.  While the realistic manager has 
an unbiased (objective) belief about 𝛼, the pessimistic manager believes that the fraction of high-
valuation consumers is ?̃? < 𝛼. We focus our analysis here on the boundary case of ?̃? = 0, i.e. the  
pessimistic manager believes that all consumers have low valuations for quality.13 
Our analysis shows that, while unilateral optimism can make both firms better off, unilateral 
pessimism cannot lead to such a win-win outcome, because the firm with a pessimistic manager 
will always be (at least weakly) worse off. Note that in the case of optimism, firm 𝑎’s optimistic 
manager increases her price because she believes that all consumers have high valuations for 
quality. As a result, managerial optimism serves as the optimistic manager’s implicit commitment 
to charging a higher price, which can mitigate price competition and benefit both firms. By 
contrast, in the case of pessimism, firm 𝑏 ’s pessimistic manager decreases the price, which 
exacerbates rather than alleviates price competition. Our findings suggest that while the effect of 
managerial optimism on firms’ profits is ambiguous, managerial pessimism is unambiguously 
detrimental to the firm. Similarly, no firms can benefit from bilateral pessimism (i.e. when both 
firms have pessimistic managers). As a result, in equilibrium, firms will not choose pessimistic 
managers over realistic managers. 
Furthermore, sometimes people can have highly divided opinions on an issue. In this case, it 
is possible for one manager to be optimistic and the other to be pessimistic. Interestingly, we find 
that when both managers are biased but in different directions, both firms can make higher profits 
than when the managers are biased in the same direction (i.e. both optimistic or both pessimistic). 
When one manager is optimistic and the other is pessimistic, the optimistic manager specializes in 
                                                 
13 We have also analyzed a model where  0 < ?̃? < 𝛼 = 1. The results and insights are qualitatively similar, i.e. 
managerial pessimism is detrimental to the firm. 
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serving the high-valuation consumers and the pessimistic manager specializes in serving the low-
valuation consumers. The asymmetric bias can mitigate price competition by increasing vertical 
differentiation and can thus benefit both firms. As a result, (𝑂, 𝑃) can be an equilibrium outcome. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Evidence has shown that entrepreneurs are an optimistic group, though their optimism often has a 
negative impact on their companies’ performance. This paper examines the effects of managerial 
optimism on the managers’ product quality and pricing decisions as well as the firms’ profits and 
the situations in which firms should hire optimistic managers. Specifically, we develop a model to 
investigate competition between two firms whose products are differentiated both horizontally and 
vertically. Our analysis provides several interesting findings. 
First, we show that a manager’s optimism increases her firm’s product quality level and 
decreases that of the competitor. When the optimistic manager overestimates the number of 
consumers who have high valuations for quality, she increases the quality level for her firm’s 
product, whereas the realistic manager chooses lower product quality to better target the low-
valuation consumers. This effect increases the level of product quality differentiation between the 
two firms, which can mitigate competition. 
Second, when only one firm is run by an optimistic manager, its price will increase while its 
competitor’s price may either increase or decrease, compared with the case in which both firms 
have realistic managers. As an optimistic manager overestimates the number of high-valuation 
consumers, she tends to increase her price. Anticipating the optimistic manager’s price increase, 
the realistic manager of the competing firm will also tend to raise her price. However, the realistic 
manager may also have incentives to lower the price, because she has lowered the product quality. 




Third, we find that a firm can be better off with managerial optimism. In particular, optimism 
has multifaceted effects on profits. First, optimism causes the firm’s manager to make biased 
choices of quality and price. Second, optimism can alleviate competition by inducing increased 
vertical differentiation between the firms’ products. Third, optimism can also serve as the 
manager’s commitment to charging a higher price, which mitigates price competition between the 
two firms. If the effect of alleviated competition is stronger than the potential detriment of the 
manager’s biased decisions, optimism can increase the firm’s expected profit. 
More interestingly, when the benefit of alleviated competition is large enough, one manager’s 
optimism may even make both firms better off. Research has shown that one may benefit from 
optimism in chicken-game scenarios, since optimism can be an agent’s commitment to making 
aggressive moves, and lead to a win-lose outcome. This paper contributes to the existing literature 
by pointing out that unilateral optimism can even generate win-win results in certain situations. 
We find that though one manager’s optimism can benefit both firms, neither firm can benefit from 
bilateral optimism, where both firms have optimistic managers. This scenario suggests that a firm 
should hire a realistic manager when managerial optimism is already pervasive in the market. 
Moreover, we have analyzed some model extensions and show that our results can still hold 
under some alternative assumptions or models. The benefits of optimism can exist regardless of 
whether firms have unit cost or fixed cost for their products. Even when product quality is 
exogenously given and managerial optimism cannot increase the level of vertical differentiation, 
unilateral optimism can serve to mitigate price competition and benefit both firms. Our main 
results are robust when managerial optimism is about the consumers’ valuation for quality instead 
of the fraction of high-valuation consumers. Moreover, we find that both firms can earn higher 
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expected profits than in the benchmark case even when the manager’s optimism is about the 
distribution of the consumers’ horizontal preferences (e.g., believing that consumers are more 
densely distributed near her firm’s location than that of the competitor). Lastly, when the 
manager’s optimism makes her believe that consumers perceive her firm’s product quality to be 
higher than it actually is, the win-win outcome can still occur under unilateral optimism due to the 
alleviation of price competition. 
Our core model has focused on managerial optimism because research has shown its existence 
and pervasiveness. However, we have also examined the impact of managerial pessimism on a 
firm’s performance. We find that, in contrast to the case of optimism, managerial pessimism, 
whether unilateral or bilateral, will not benefit the firm(s) and can reduce both firms’ profits. 
Nonetheless, when one firm has an optimistic manager while the other firm has a pessimistic 
manager, both firms can benefit from the differentiated biases of their managers, because they will 
aim to target different segments of customers. 
We conclude this paper by pointing out some directions for future research. First, our study 
has focused on duopolistic competition; future research may study the effect of optimism in other 
competitive settings, e.g., firms in decentralized channel settings. Second, our analytical 
framework is limited to a one-period game and does not study repeated interactions between firms. 
Specifically, in a repeated-game setting with uncertain demand conditions, forecasting future 
market conditions based on past experiences may alter managerial optimism. The outcome of such 
a dynamic game, where managers make product quality and pricing decisions in each period, will 
depend on the correlation between the market demands across periods. If the demands across 
periods are perfectly correlated, then both managers will know the true demand after the first 
period, and the game will result in the (𝑅, 𝑅) equilibrium from the second period on. If the 
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demands across periods are completely uncorrelated (i.e. independent), the dynamic game will 
reduce to a series of independent one-period games, where the optimistic manager may stay 
optimistic in the long run. If the demands across periods are moderately correlated, the optimistic 
manager may gradually update her belief, and the game may eventually converge to the (𝑅, 𝑅) 
equilibrium. This dynamic game deserves its own separate study, so we leave it to future research 
to more systematically explore the new insights from such situations. Third, our analysis focuses 
on a duopoly, while increase of firm numbers may change the effects of optimism. In particular, 
when there are numerous firms in a competitive market, the effect of the managerial optimism of 
one firm on the market price is marginal, so managerial optimism is not likely to mitigate the 
competition and thus may not benefit the firm. Fourth, our study focuses on firms’ profit, while an 
analysis of optimism’s effects on social welfare can also be interesting. In our model, optimism 
lowers social welfare because it can leave some customers unserved, whereas they are served in 
the benchmark cases in which there is no managerial optimism. However, given that there are other 
types of distortion and market failure in reality, optimism increase social welfare in certain 
situations. As a simple example, if a voter optimistically believes that her vote will be pivotal in 
the election, she will be more likely to vote. Optimism will improve voter turnout in this case and 
may very well increase social welfare. Lastly, similar to an approach in Zou et al. (2018) in the 
context of anticipated regret, it may also be interesting to examine how managerial optimism will 
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Chapter 2  
Quality Design Outsourcing under Demand 




Many brand-owning retailers outsource product production to manufacturers and focus primarily 
on product design, development, and marketing. Typically, the retailers specify the required 
quality level and the specified quantity of a product in a wholesale price contract with the 
manufacturer. This practice is referred to as “contract manufacturing” (CM) and has become a 
well-established business model in a variety of industries, including electronics, pharmaceuticals, 
automotive, and food and beverage production (Plambeck and Taylor, 2005). For example, Apple, 
Dell, and Hewlett-Packard design their products but outsource the manufacturing to Foxconn,14 
without which the manufacturing cost may be significantly higher. Similarly, Cisco has established 
“a virtual supply chain with limitless capacity” by outsourcing the manufacturing of its products 
to contract manufacturers all over the world.15 
In addition to production outsourcing, sometimes brand-owning retailers also outsource 
product design to manufacturers. This practice is referred to as “original design manufacturing” 
(ODM) and has gained increasing popularity among downstream retailers in the last few decades. 





Large supermarket chains, like Walmart and Target, often carry private label products under their 
own brand but designed and manufactured by upstream suppliers. Celestica, an electronics 
manufacturing service company, designs products for customers, including IBM, Sun, and Cisco. 
Moreover, multiple manufacturers in the pharmaceuticals industry have been undertaking research 
and development, creating a $30 billion drug-development and manufacturing market (Kaya and 
Özer, 2009). In the notebook industry, Taiwanese manufacturers, who design and produce laptops 
for the largest PC companies in the world, play an irreplaceable role in this industry (Yang and 
Chen, 2013). For example, Quanta Computer, the world’s largest designer and manufacturer of 
notebooks, designs and produces 25% of all Acer notebooks. Similarly, Compal Electronics, 
another Taiwan-based firm, designs and manufacturers laptops for Dell, Toshiba, HP and Acer.16 
ODM allows a retailer to outsource product design to firms who have a comparative advantage 
on R&D, potentially lowering the development cost and hence the entry barrier of a market, and 
focus on marketing and retailing. For example, Kylie Jenner, an American internet celebrity with 
little professional experience in cosmetics, founded her own cosmetics company, Kylie Cosmetics, 
in 2015. Thanks to ODM, the company manage to outsource the design and production of its 
products entirely and solely focuses on marketing. While making sales worth $360 million in 2018, 
the company only have seven full-time employees. Due to the largely successful Kylie Cosmetics, 
Kylie Jenner was named the youngest-ever self-made billionaire by Forbes.17 
While an ODM supply chain can have many potentials, the downstream retailer may also have 
quality concerns over the product, since it usually does not get to specify the quality level or to 
monitor the production process. Thus, one may wonder under what conditions a firm can benefit 





from outsourcing its product development as well as production to manufacturers. This paper 
develops an analytical framework to analyze the effects of ODM and answer this question. 
Specifically, we compare an ODM supply chain with a CM supply chain in terms of product 
quality, prices, and firms’ profits. 
In our model, a retailer, who sells a product directly to end users, outsources its production to 
an upstream manufacturer. The retailer can choose CM and design the product by itself, or choose 
ODM and outsource the design process to the manufacturer. We address the following research 
questions. How does ODM affect the retailer’s profit as well as the manufacturer’s? Do ODM and 
CM produce products with different quality levels and result in different prices? When should the 
retailer optimally choose ODM over CM? 
Our analysis reveals the following main findings. First, we show that in an ODM supply chain, 
where the manufacturer designs the product and chooses the quality level, it tends to choose a 
quality level lower than that which the retailer would choose. On the other hand, when the retailer 
offers the wholesale price in an ODM supply chain, it chooses a price lower than what the 
manufacturer would choose. The different quality levels and wholesale prices are essentially 
different forms of double marginalization problem. In ODM, when the manufacturer decreases the 
quality level, it lowers both its marginal cost and consumers’ demand for the product at any given 
price level. While the former benefits the manufacturer alone, the latter hurts both the manufacturer 
and the retailer. Not taking into account the retailer’s loss, the manufacturer would choose a quality 
level lower than what the retailer would choose in CM. For the same reason, in CM, the 
manufacturer would choose a wholesale price higher than what the retailer would choose in ODM. 
As a result, both the quality level and the wholesale price are lower in ODM than in CM. 
Furthermore, since ODM produces a product with a lower quality at a lower wholesale price, the 
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retailer also charges a retail price lower than that in a CM supply chain. As a result, outsourcing 
the design of product quality to the manufacturer would lead to a product with lower quality level, 
lower wholesale price, and lower retail price. 
Second, we find that ODM is optimal for the retailer when demand uncertainty is low. 
Conversely, when demand uncertainty is high, the retailer is better off choosing CM. When 
demand uncertainty is low, the retailer wants to obtain a product that can be accepted by the market 
in both the high state and the low state. Hence, the retailer would outsource the quality design 
process to the manufacturer and get a product with relatively low quality at low cost. The retailer 
would then be able to charge a relatively low retail price, which can be affordable to the consumers 
in the low state. In contrast, when demand uncertainty is high, the low state is so unprofitable that 
the retailer would practically give up the low state and maximize its expected profit by mainly 
focusing on the high state. Thus, the retailer would choose to design product quality by itself in 
order to obtain a product with a high quality at a high cost, so that it can fulfill the demand in the 
high state. 
Third, our analysis shows that, even if it is more cost efficient for the retailer to design product 
quality by itself, it may nevertheless choose to outsource the design process to the manufacturer, 
i.e. ODM, as long as the loss from the higher design cost is not too large. Contrary to many 
predictions in the literature that retailers outsource product design to manufacturers who have a 
cost advantage (Gray et al. 2009b; Choi 2007), our analysis reveals that the retailer’s choice 
between ODM and CM does not completely depend on cost efficiency. 
Fourth, we find that when the retailer optimally decides whether to outsource quality design 
based on demand uncertainty, the manufacturer’s profit is non-monotone with demand uncertainty. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom that uncertainty in the market usually limits a firm’s profitability, 
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we show that the manufacturer’s profit first decreases and then increases with demand uncertainty. 
When demand uncertainty is low, the retailer wants to strike a balance between the low state and 
the high state. As demand uncertainty increases, the retailer becomes more cautious and chooses 
a lower quality level and pays a lower wholesale price, which decreases the manufacturer’s profit. 
However, when demand uncertainty is high enough, the retailer would mainly focus on the high 
state. In that case, as demand uncertainty increases, the difference between the high state and the 
low state increases, and the retailer would be willing to pay a higher wholesale price for a higher 
quality level, in order to better cater to the consumers in the high state. As a result, when demand 
uncertainty is high enough, manufacturer’s profit will increase with demand uncertainty. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we review the related literature. 
Section 2.3 introduces the core model framework and discusses the benchmark case in which there 
is no demand uncertainty. Section 2.4 presents the main results. Section 2.5 extends our core model 
and checks the robustness of our results in some alternative settings. Section 2.6 concludes the 
paper with some discussions for future research. All proofs are provided in the Appendix. 
2.2 Literature Review 
In this paper, we study the effects of outsourcing, on which there is extensive literature. 
Specifically, we focus on quality design outsourcing under demand uncertainty. While research 
has shown that outsourcing has the ability to lower innovation costs and risks, to improve financial 
performance, and to increase productivity (Michael and Michael 2011), the most prominent reason 
for firms to outsource the production or design of products is cost saving. As shown by Gray et al. 
(2009b) both analytically and empirically, firms that place a priority on low cost have a high 
propensity to outsource. Similarly, Choi (2007) shows that when factor prices are not equalized 
internationally, a firm may outsource the process which uses its scarce source intensively. For 
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example, given that labor cost is high in the United States, a U.S. based firm may outsource its 
labor-intensive manufacturing activities to manufacturers in developing countries, where labor 
cost can be significantly lower. 
However, it is noteworthy that it is also shown in the literature that the cost saving benefit from 
outsourcing may not be sustainable in the long run. In particular, Anderson and Parker (2002) 
shows that when the effects of learning over time are taken into consideration, outsourcing 
decisions can create a path-dependent outsourcing trap in which a firm experiences higher long-
run costs after an immediate cost benefit. In this case, partial outsourcing, i.e. outsourcing a 
fraction of component production, may become optimal and dominate either complete outsourcing 
or complete insourcing. Similarly, Gray et al. (2009a) investigates a two-period game between a 
retailer and a manufacturer, wherein both firms can reduce their production costs through learning-
by-doing, and finds that the retailer’s outsourcing strategy may be dynamic and change from period 
to period, and partial outsourcing can be an optimal strategy. 
Outsourcing can also benefit firms in ways other than cost saving. For instance, outsourcing 
may mitigate competition under certain circumstances and lead to a win-win outcome. Cachon and 
Harker (2002) shows that when competing firms face scale economies, they can mitigate price 
competition through outsourcing because it reduces a firm’s desire to build scale to lower cost. As 
a result, outsourcing can lead to a win-win outcome in which both retailers and the manufacturer 
make higher profits than without outsourcing. Similarly, Gilbert et al. (2006) demonstrates that 
outsourcing provides a mechanism by which the two competing firms can credibly signal that they 
will not overinvest in cost reduction, mitigating cost competition and benefiting both firms. 
On the contrary, Arya et al. (2008) demonstrates the case in which outsourcing can benefit a 
firm at the cost of its competitor. When a monopolistic input supplier serves two competing 
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retailers, a retailer may buy an input from the supplier at a price above its in-house cost of 
production, in order to limit the supplier’s incentive to provide the input on extremely favorable 
terms to its retail competitor. Consequently, a retailer may pay a premium to outsource production 
to a common supplier to raise its competitor’s costs. 
The literature has revealed potential risks over product design outsourcing as well, the most 
prominent of which is quality concerns. Feng and Lu (2010) argues that ODM blurs the boundary 
between manufacturers and brand-owning retailers, which can subsequently dampen their quality 
incentives. Naturally, if both the manufacturer and the retailer believe that consumers will blame 
the other party for potential quality issues, both of them will have less incentive to ensure a good 
quality product. Furthermore, as shown by Kaya and Özer (2009), quality risk is substantial in 
outsourcing when product quality is noncontractible, or when the cost to increase quality is private 
information to the manufacturer.  
Nevertheless, under demand uncertainty, outsourcing may actually increase quality under 
certain circumstances, as shown by Jerath et al. (2017). While demand uncertainty reduces a firm’s 
optimal product quality (since a lower quality helps to mitigate the risk of overproduction because 
of lower production cost), this optimal quality level can be higher in a decentralized channel, 
compared to a centralized channel, because a wholesale price contract shields the manufacturer 
from inventory risk. Liu et al. (2018) shows similar results that optimal quality for the 
manufacturer can be higher in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel. 
Given that the literature has shown that outsourcing has an important effect on product quality, 
it is interesting that quality concerns may not play a significant role in firms’ outsourcing decisions, 
as demonstrated by Gray et al. (2009b),. In other words, a firm that emphasizes quality is as likely 
to outsource as a firm that does not emphasize quality. However, they also argue that this result is 
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likely caused by managers’ overconfidence regarding their ability to manage quality across 
organizational boundaries as well as their negligence of unintended consequences of their 
outsourcing choices. 
Product design outsourcing also raises concerns over diminishing product differentiation. 
Since a manufacturer may simultaneously serve more than one client, the manufacturer may have 
incentive to offer similar designs to different clients, which can “dilute” product differentiation 
and therefore intensify market competition (Carbone 2003; Dedrick and Kraemer 2006; Amaral 
and Parker 2008). For example, Tzeng and Chang (2003) reports that Quanta Computer, a Taiwan-
based notebook computer manufacturer, has offered several clients different notebook models 
derived from a common prototype. 
Moreover, Feng and Lu (2010) points out that the design capability gained by the manufacturer 
in the ODM process may encourage new competitors to enter the market and hence foster 
competition. For example, ODM suppliers allow mobile operators like T-Mobile to offer their own 
cellphones at a relatively low price and directly compete against other cellphone companies that 
are also clients of the same ODM suppliers. Without the ODM model, mobile operators that have 
no design experience may have to face a much higher entry barrier when entering the cellphone 
market. Furthermore, as revealed by Feng and Lu (2010), sometimes an ODM firm itself can 
eventually become a direct competitor of its clients. For instance, Acer Inc. started from a humble 
and anonymous original design manufacturer and eventually became the 4th largest PC maker with 
its own globally recognized brand. 
When retailers focus on innovations, including research and development, product design, and 
marketing, and sell their production facilities to manufacturers, production outsourcing may also 
have a negative impact on innovation. In particular, as shown by Plambeck and Taylor (2005), 
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given the intractability of innovation, retailers will invest less in innovation than is ideal for the 
industry as a whole. As a result, outsourcing may reduce the profitability of the industry generally 
by weakening the incentives for innovation. Through an examination of 24 outsourced 
development projects at Siemens, Cui et al. (2009) identifies five drivers of success in innovation 
outsourcing, most important among which are project-specific partner competence and in-house 
competence. 
This paper contributes to the literature on supply chain and outsourcing in multiple ways. First, 
while previous research has investigated the effects of the practice to outsource product 
manufacturing and design, we establish an analytical model to directly compare these two distinct 
but closely related forms of outsourcing practice, namely CM and ODM. Second, we study the 
effects of ODM under demand uncertainty, and reveal that the retailer tends to outsource product 
design in a low-uncertainty market, and insource in a high-uncertainty one. Third, we innovatively 
show that the manufacturer’s profit is non-monotone with demand uncertainty. Specifically, an 
increase in demand uncertainty can lead to an increase in the manufacturer’s profit. Fourth, 
whereas previous research emphasizes cost saving in design as the major benefit of ODM, we 
demonstrate that the retailer may be able to benefit from ODM even if it has a lower design cost 
than the manufacturer. In other words, the retailer may want to outsource product design to the 
manufacturer, even if the manufacturer does not have a cost advantage. 
2.3 Model   
Let us consider a supply chain with one retailer and one manufacturer, denoted by 𝑅  and 𝑀, 
respectively. The retailer sells a unit product of quality level 𝑞 at price 𝑝 to the end consumers and 
outsources its production to the manufacturer. The marginal cost for the manufacturer to produce 
a unit of the product is 𝑐 = 𝑞2, as higher quality will impose a higher cost on the manufacturer for 
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each unit of the product produced. 
The consumers’ utility from consuming the product is 𝑢 = 𝜃𝑞 − 𝑝 , where 𝜃  represents 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay for quality and is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Consumers may 
choose to buy one unit of the product at most, or do not make purchase and choose the outside 
option, whose utility is normalized to 0. The demand of the product is ex ante uncertain and may 
be either high or low. Specifically, the size of the market, denoted by 𝑁, is 1 + 𝛿 in the high state 
and 1 − 𝛿  in the low state, where 𝛿 ∈ (0,1) measures the degree of demand uncertainty. The 




that with demand uncertainty, there may be unsold inventory under optimal pricing. We assume 
the excess inventory has no resale value and normalize the salvage value of the product to zero. In 
Section 5.2, we relax this assumption and assumes that the manufacturer allows the retailer to 
return unsold products at a discounted price. 
In this research, we consider two types of supply chains: contract manufacturing (CM) and 
original design manufacturing (ODM). In the CM supply chain, the retailer designs the product 
quality 𝑞 and requests that the manufacturer produce the product. The manufacturer gives the 
retailer a quote of the wholesale price 𝑤, and the retailer decides the quantity that it wants to order 
and stock as inventory, which is denoted by 𝑖. After the production is completed, the market 
demand is realized and the retailer chooses retail price 𝑝 accordingly. In the ODM supply chain, 
the retailer gives the manufacturer an offer of the wholesale price, and the manufacturer submits 
the quality level it can provide at this price. Based on the quality level offered by the manufacturer, 
the retailer decides the quantity to order. Afterwards, the demand is realized and the retailer 
chooses the retail price. (We will refer to the first type of supply chain as CM and the second type 
as ODM in the rest of the paper.) 
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Thus, there are four stages to the game. In CM, in the first stage, the retailer decides quality 
level; in the second stage, the manufacturer decides the wholesale price; in the third stage, the 
retailer decides inventory level; and in the fourth stage, market demand is realized and the retailer 
sets the retail price accordingly. Retailer’s profit is realized in the fourth stage. In ODM, in the 
first stage, the retailer decides the wholesale price; in the second stage, the manufacturer decides 
quality level; in the third stage, the retailer decides inventory level; and in the fourth stage, market 
demand is realized and the retailer sets the retail price accordingly. Retailer’s profit is realized in 
the fourth stage. Figure 2.1 shows the timelines of the game in both CM and ODM. 
 
Figure 2.1 Timelines in CM and ODM 
Note that in our model, the retailer has to decide on the inventory level before the demand is 
realized, but can choose the retail price afterwards. This assumption represents the fact that 
retailers oftentimes have to stockpile commodities before the selling season, but can adjust the 
retail price relatively easily by offering discounts during the selling season. Moreover, the retailer 
moves first in both CM and ODM, so the retailer always enjoys first-mover advantage in this 
model, which is consistent with the fact that the brand-owning retailers oftentimes have a larger 
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bargaining power than their upstream suppliers in a supply chain. 
Benchmark: No Demand Uncertainty 
First, we consider the benchmark case in which there is no demand uncertainty in the market. 
In this case, we normalize the market size to 1 and make it common knowledge to both the retailer 
and the manufacturer.  
We solve for the equilibrium outcome through backward induction. In CM, in the last stage of 
the game, the retailer sets the retail price based on the quality level and wholesale price of the 
product. Since there is no demand uncertainty, the retailer does not face the possible problem of 
unsold inventory and does not have to specify inventory level before demand is realized. The 
retailer’s profit function is: 𝜋𝑅
𝐶 = (𝑝𝐶 − 𝑤𝐶)𝑠𝐶, where 𝑠 represents the sales volume at a given 
retail price. When consumers make a purchase, the threshold consumer who is indifferent between 
making a purchase and the outside option has utility: 𝜃𝐶𝑞𝐶 − 𝑝𝐶 = 0, which gives us the demand: 
𝑑𝐶 = (1 −
𝑝𝐶
𝑞𝐶
), where 𝑑 represents the total demand of the product at a given retail price. Note 
that the sales volume cannot exceed either the demand or the inventory level, so we have 𝑠𝐶 =
min {𝑑𝐶 , 𝑖𝐶}. In the benchmark case, since there is no demand uncertainty, the retailer can fully 
anticipate the demand, so we always have 𝑠𝐶 = 𝑖𝐶 = 𝑑𝐶 = (1 −
𝑝𝐶
𝑞𝐶
). Maximizing the retailer’s 




In the second-to-last stage of the game, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price. Its profit 
function is: 𝜋𝑀





) . Maximizing the manufacturer’s 





In the first stage of the game, the retailer decides the quality level. Plugging 𝑝𝐶 and 𝑤𝐶 into 
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, and we can 
solve for other variables accordingly. 
Similarly, we can solve for the equilibrium outcome through backward induction for ODM. 
Lemma 1 shows the equilibrium outcomes for both supply chains. Numerical form of the results 
are collected in Table 2.1. 















































(339 − 59√33). 
Note that players of the game, namely 𝑅 and 𝑀, are labeled with subscripts, while types of 
supply chains, namely OM and CDM, are labeled with superscripts. We will use this notation 
consistently throughout this paper.  
Table 2.1 Equilibrium Outcome in Benchmark Case 
  Integrated ODM CM 
Quality 0.3333 0.2019 0.3333 
Wholesale Price - 0.1095 0.2222 
Retail Price 0.2222 0.1557 0.2778 
Demand 0.3333 0.2287 0.1667 
Retailer Profit - 0.0105 0.0093 
Retailer Share - 40.18% 33.33% 
Manufacturer 
Profit - 0.0157 0.0185 
Manufacturer 
Share - 59.82% 66.67% 
Channel Profit 0.0370 0.0263 0.0278 
 
Lemma 1 demonstrates that when there is no demand uncertainty in the market, i.e. 𝛿 = 0, the 
equilibrium quality level, wholesale price, and retail price are all higher in CM than in ODM. In 
other words, when the retailer decides quality level and the manufacturer decides wholesale price, 
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the manufacturer produces products with a higher quality and charges a higher wholesale price in 
equilibrium. As a result, the retailer also charges a higher retail price in equilibrium. 
The difference of quality level and wholesale price in CM and ODM is actually a different 
form of double marginalization. A typical double marginalization problem is caused by the 
negligence of the other party’s loss of profit when one party in the supply chain is maximizing its 
profit. When the retailer raises the retail price, it increases its unit profit but decreases its demand. 
While the increasing unit profit benefits the retailer alone, the decreasing demand hurts both the 
retailer and the manufacturer. Not taking the loss of the manufacturer into consideration, the 
retailer would choose a retail price higher than what is optimal for the channel as a whole. 
Similarly, in ODM, when the manufacturer decreases quality level, it lowers both the 
manufacturer’s marginal cost and the consumers’ demand for the product at any given price level. 
While the lower marginal cost benefits the manufacturer alone, the lower demand hurts both the 
manufacturer and the retailer. Not taking the loss of the retailer into consideration, the 
manufacturer would set a quality level lower than what the retailer would choose. As a result, 
quality level is lower in ODM than in CM. Similarly, in CM, when the manufacturer increases 
wholesale price, it increases the unit profit of the manufacturer, but also forces the retailer to 
increase the retail price, which in turn decreases demand of the product. While the increasing unit 
profit benefits the manufacturer alone, the decreasing demand hurts both the manufacturer and the 
retailer. Not taking the loss of the retailer into consideration, the manufacturer would choose a 
wholesale price than what the retailer would choose. As a result, wholesale price is higher in CM 
than in ODM. Since both quality level and wholesale price are lower in ODM than in CM, the 
retailer also chooses a lower retail price in ODM, and thus we have different equilibrium outcomes 
in ODM and CM. 
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Moreover, the manufacturer’s profit is higher in CM than in ODM, whereas the retailer’s profit 
is higher in ODM than in CM. Therefore, the retailer is better off setting the wholesale price itself 
and letting the manufacturer design the quality level when there is no demand uncertainty. 
2.4 Analysis 
As demonstrated in the benchmark case, CM and ODM induce different strategic behaviors 
for both players in the game, and hence can lead to different quality levels and prices in 
equilibrium. As demand uncertainty changes, the optimal quality and price may also change, so 
the retailer may want to choose a different supply chain accordingly. In this section, we first study 
how changes in demand uncertainty can affect the retailer’s choice between CM and ODM. 
Proposition 1. There exist 𝛿∗ ∈ (0,1) such that when 𝛿 < 𝛿∗, the retailer is better off choosing 
ODM than 𝐶𝑀; when 𝛿 > 𝛿∗, the retailer is better off choosing CM than ODM. 
Proposition 1 reveals that the retailer’s choice between ODM and CM is directly dependent on 
demand uncertainty in the market. This is consistent with the fact that, in the benchmark case, 
when there is no demand uncertainty, the retailer would choose ODM over CM. 
Recall that in an ODM supply chain, the retailer sets the wholesale price and lets the 
manufacturer design the quality level of the product. As discussed in the last section, the retailer 
has an incentive to offer a relatively low wholesale price, and the manufacturer would design a 
relatively low quality level. On the other hand, in a CM supply chain, the retailer designs the 
quality level and lets the manufacturer decide the wholesale price. In that case, the retailer would 
desire a product with a higher quality, and the manufacturer would want to charge a higher 
wholesale price as well. Consequently, both the quality level and the wholesale price are lower in 
an ODM supply chain when demand uncertainty is the same. 
Note that when demand uncertainty is low, the difference in the market size between the high 
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state and the low state is not very large. In the low state, there are still a large number of consumers 
from whom the retailer can make a significant profit. Therefore, the retailer, when making its 
decisions on quality level and wholesale price, wants to take into account not only the high state 
but also the low state. Given that in the case of low state, the retailer must charge a retail price low 
enough due to the low demand, it would prefer to choose a product with relatively low quality and 
low cost so that it can afford to charge a relatively low retail price in the low state. Thus, the retailer 
is better off choosing ODM, which provides a product with a lower quality level and a lower 
wholesale price than CM. 
On the contrary, when demand uncertainty is high enough, the gap between the high state and 
the low state becomes so large that the retailer would find it optimal to practically give up the low 
state and mainly focus on the potential high state when deciding quality level and wholesale price. 
After all, the market size is too small in the low state for the retailer to make much profit anyway. 
In this case, the retailer would like to have a product with high quality and high cost, so it can 
charge a high retail price in the high state and fully utilize the large size of the market. Hence, the 
retailer is better off choosing CM, which provides a product with a higher quality level and a higher 
wholesale price. 
Depending on the level of demand uncertainty, the retailer would choose a different supply 
chain to induce the optimal quality level and wholesale price. When demand uncertainty is low, it 
chooses ODM to induce low wholesale price at the cost of low quality and, when demand 
uncertainty is high, it chooses CM to induce high quality at the cost of high wholesale price. As a 
result, the manufacturer’s profit also largely depends on demand uncertainty, which is pointed out 
in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. Given that the retailer chooses supply chains optimally, the manufacturer’s 
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profit is non-monotone with demand uncertainty. It first decreases with demand uncertainty when 
𝛿 < 𝛿∗ and then increases with demand uncertainty when 𝛿 > 𝛿∗. 
Conventional wisdom tells us that a firm usually makes a lower expected profit when demand 
is uncertain in the market. However, contrary to popular belief, Proposition 2 reveals that the 
manufacturer’s profit first decrease and then increases with demand uncertainty. This relationship 
is demonstrated in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 Manufacturer’s Profit 
Note that when 𝛿 < 𝛿∗, the retailer would choose ODM and decide the wholesale price by 
itself. As demand uncertainty increases, the demand in the low state decreases, so the retail price 
charged by the retailer in the low state has to decrease, too. In order to be able to afford a lower 
retail price, the retailer has to choose a lower wholesale price in the first stage of the game. As a 
result, when demand uncertainty increases, the wholesale price offered by the retailer decreases, 
which reduces the manufacturer’s profit. Thus, when 𝛿 < 𝛿∗, the manufacturer’s profit decreases 
with 𝛿. 
On the other hand, when 𝛿 > 𝛿∗, the retailer forgoes the low state and primarily focuses on the 
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high state to maximize its expected profit. When demand uncertainty increases, the demand in the 
high state increases, so the retailer would choose a higher quality to fulfil that demand and be 
willing to accept a higher wholesale price. As a result, when demand uncertainty increases, the 
wholesale price charged by the manufacturer also increases, which increases the manufacturer’s 
profit. Thus, when 𝛿 > 𝛿∗ , the manufacturer’s profit increases with 𝛿 . Consequently, the 
manufacturer’s profit is non-monotone with demand uncertainty.  
So far, we have assumed that the manufacturer has to incur a marginal cost to produce each 
unit of the product and normalize any fixed cost incurred in the process of development to zero. In 
practice, firms often have to incur a fixed cost in the process of R&D. In order to investigate how 
the cost to design a product affects the retailer’s choice of supply chain, we assume that the 
development process of a product induces a fixed cost, 𝐹, on the firm. The retailer can either 
choose CM and incur the design cost 𝐹𝑅  by itself, or choose ODM and pay 𝐹𝑀  to hire the 
manufacturer to design the product. Proposition 3 reveals the effects of fixed development cost. 
Proposition 3. The retailer may choose ODM and let the manufacturer design product quality, 
even if the manufacturer has a higher design cost. 
It is often argued that downstream firms should outsource product design to upstream suppliers 
who can design the product at a lower cost, due to their experience, technological expertise, and 
economy of scale. However, as shown in Proposition 3, development cost is not the retailer’s only 
concern when deciding whether to outsource product design. Since outsourcing product design 
changes both players’ behavior in the game, the retailer would like to choose different supply 
chains in order to induce the optimal quality level and wholesale price under different demand 
uncertainties. If the benefit gained from choosing the supply chain that corresponds to the demand 
uncertainty faced by the retailer exceeds the loss resulting from the extra cost in product 
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development, the retailer may very well choose a supply chain that incurs a higher fixed 
development cost. 
When demand uncertainty is low, the retailer would like to choose ODM to induce a low 
wholesale price. Even if the retailer has the advantage in designing the product, as long as the 
advantage is not too large, the retailer would still optimally choose to let the manufacturer design 
the product so that it can pay a relatively low wholesale price. On the other hand, when demand 
uncertainty is high, the retailer would like to choose CM to induce high quality level. Even if the 
manufacturer has the advantage in designing the product, the retailer would still choose to design 
the product by itself to induce a higher quality level. Thus, our analysis shows that when deciding 
whether to outsource product design, the retailer takes into account not only the design cost but 
also demand uncertainty and strategic dynamics in different supply chains. 
2.5 Extensions 
2.5.1 Uncertainty of Consumers’ Willingness-To-Pay 
In our analysis, we have assumed that the total market size is uncertain while the distribution of 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay is known to the firms. In some circumstances, it is also possible 
that the total market size is known but the distribution of the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for 
quality is uncertain. In this section, to investigate this type of demand uncertainty, we study an 
alternative model where firms ex ante do not know what fraction of consumers have high 
valuations versus low valuations. 
In this model, in order to focus on the uncertainty of consumers’ willingness-to-pay for quality, 
we assume that the total market size is common knowledge and normalized to 1. Moreover, there 
are two types of consumers, denoted by 𝑗 ∈ {𝐻, 𝐿}. Let 𝜃𝑗  denote type-j consumer’s willingness to 
59 
 
pay for quality, where 𝜃𝐿 < 𝜃𝐻. For simplicity, we assume 𝜃𝐻 = 1 and 𝜃𝐿 =
1
4
. Although the size 
of the market is fixed, the proportion of high-type consumers is ex ante uncertain. In particular, 
there are two possible states of the market, the low state and the high state. In the low state, the 
fraction of consumers having high willingness-to-pay is 𝛼, where 𝛼 ∈ (1,
1
2
), and the fraction of 
consumers having low willingness-to-pay is 1 − 𝛼; in the high state, the fraction of consumers 
have high willingness-to-pay is 1 − 𝛼, and the fraction of consumers having low willingness-to-




. Note that the smaller 𝛼 is, the larger the difference between the low state and 
the high state is. Hence, 𝛼 is the reverse indicator of demand uncertainty in this model, in the sense 
that the higher 𝛼 is, the lower demand uncertainty is. 
Given that the size of the market is fixed in this model, we omit the stage of retailer deciding 
inventory level and assume that the retailer can choose the quantity of its order freely after the 
state of the market is realized.  
Thus, there are three stages to the game. In CM, in the first stage, the retailer decides quality 
level; in the second stage, the manufacturer decides the wholesale price; in the third stage, market 
demand is realized and the retailer sets the retail price accordingly. Retailer’s profit is realized in 
the third stage. In ODM, in the first stage, the retailer decides the wholesale price; in the second 
stage, the manufacturer decides quality level; in the third stage, market demand is realized and the 
retailer sets the retail price accordingly. Retailer’s profit is realized in the third stage. Figure 2.3 




Figure 2.3 Timelines under Valuation Uncertainty 
Recall that in the previous section, we show that when demand uncertainty is low, the retailer 
makes higher expected profit in ODM; when demand uncertainty is high, the retailer makes higher 
expected profit in CM. We find that our result is qualitatively the same in this model. Similar to 
the core model, when the difference of the fractions of high-type consumers between the low state 
and the high state is large, the retailer makes a higher expected profit if it chooses CM than if it 
chooses ODM; when the difference is small, the retailer makes a higher expected profit if it 
chooses ODM than if it chooses CM.  
Thus, when the total market size is known but the distribution of the consumers’ willingness-
to-pay for quality is uncertain, retailer should still optimally choose ODM when the uncertainty is 
low, and choose CM when the uncertainty is high. 
2.5.2 Return Policy 
In our analysis, we have assumed that any excess inventory that remains unsold after 
consumers make purchase decisions have no resale value and normalized the salvage value of the 
product to zero. In some cases, particularly when the retailer has relatively large bargaining power, 
the manufacturer may allow the retailer to return the unsold inventory at a discounted price. Given 
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that such a return policy potentially lowers the retailer’s risk of over-stocking, it may also change 
the influence of demand uncertainty and the retailer’s choice of supply chains. Hence, in the 
section, we investigate the effects of CM and ODM when the manufacturer offers a return policy. 
In this alternative setting, we assume that the manufacturer allows the retailer to return all 
unsold products at a discount ratio, 𝜌. Hence, after consumers make purchase decisions, the retailer 
returns unsold products to the manufacturer and generates revenue min {𝜌𝑤(𝑖 − 𝑠), 0}, where 𝑤 is 
the wholesale price, 𝑖 is the inventory level, and 𝑠 is the sales volume. We assume that the returned 
products have no resale value to the manufacturer. Other settings and assumptions remain 
unchanged from the core model. 
Our analysis shows that the effects of the return policy critically depends on the discount ration, 
𝜌. If 𝜌 is small, our result from previous sections remain unchanged: the retailer is better off with 
ODM when demand uncertainty is low, and better off with CM when demand uncertainty is high. 
However, if 𝜌 is large, ODM can always generated a higher expected profit for the retailer, and 
therefore is the optimal supply chain for the retailer regardless of demand uncertainty. 
Note that the return policy lowers the loss caused by unsold inventory, and therefore essentially 
acts as an insurance against demand uncertainty, in the sense that the potential loss of the retailer 
in the state of low demand is partly compensated by the manufacturer. Thus, the return policy 
lowers the retailer’s risk of unsold inventory under demand uncertainty, and may change the 
retailer’s optimal choice of supply chain under a given level of demand uncertainty. 
When 𝜌 is small, the compensation in the low state is small, so the effects of the insurance is 
limited and does not change the retailer’s incentive significantly. Consequently, the retailer’s 
optimal choice of supply chain remains unchanged from the core model.  
On the other hand, when 𝜌 is large, the insurance is very favorable to the retailer and can 
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significantly lower the risk of unsold inventory under demand uncertainty. Recall that without the 
return policy, the retailer is ex ante better off with CM only if demand uncertainty is large enough. 
However, given that the manufacturer provides a generous return policy which insures the retailer 
against demand uncertainty, the risk of demand uncertainty faced by the retailer is lowered to a 
degree that the retailer no longer finds CM optimal. Essentially, the return policy and CM work as 
substitutes, since both of them are tools for the retailer to protect itself under high demand 
uncertainty. If when one of them, namely the return policy in this case, is powerful enough, the 
retailer does not need the other one, namely CM, anymore. As a result, when the return policy is 
favorable enough, the retailer will always be better off with ODM. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Outsourcing has been a common business practice in various industries for a long time, and 
different forms of outsourcing have developed in recent years. Nowadays, firms can outsource not 
only the production of a product but also the development and design of it to manufacturers. This 
paper compares original design manufacturing (ODM), in which the retailer outsources both the 
production and the development of a product to the manufacturer, with contract manufacturing 
(CM), in which the retailer only outsources the production process. Specifically, we develop a 
model to investigate the retailer’s choice of supply chains and its effect on the manufacturer’s 
profit under demand uncertainty. Our analysis provides several interesting findings. 
First, we show that, in ODM, the product has lower quality, lower wholesale price, and lower 
retail price than in CM. The different equilibrium outcomes are essentially different forms of 
double marginalization problem in different supply chains. The classic double marginalization 
problem is caused by the fact the when one party in the supply chains maximizes its profit, it 
neglects the negative externality incurred upon the other party in the supply chain, and makes a 
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decision suboptimal for the channel as a whole. In ODM, if the manufacturer lowers the quality 
level, it decreases both its marginal cost and consumers’ demand for the product at any given price 
level. The former benefits only the manufacturer, whereas the latter hurts both the manufacturer 
and the retailer. Since the manufacturer does not take into consideration the retailer’s loss of profit 
due to a lower quality, it will choose a quality level lower than what the retailer would choose in 
CM. As a result, the product has a lower quality level in ODM than in CM. Similarly, in CM, if 
the manufacturer increases the wholesale price, it increases its own unit margin, but forces the 
retailer to choose a higher retail price and decreases the sales volume. The former benefits only 
the manufacturer, while the latter hurts both the manufacturer and the retailer. Since the 
manufacturer does not take the retailer’s loss of profit into account when choosing the wholesale 
price, it will choose a wholesale price higher than when the retailer would choose in ODM. 
Consequently, the equilibrium wholesale price is lower in ODM than in CM. Moreover, given that 
the product has lower quality and lower cost in ODM, the retailer charges a lower retail price in 
this case. As a result, the product’s quality level, wholesale price, and retail price are all lower in 
ODM than in CM. 
Second, we find that the retailer is better off outsourcing product design to the manufacturer 
when demand uncertainty is low, and not outsourcing when demand uncertainty is high. When 
demand uncertainty is low, the difference between the high state and the low state is small, so the 
retailer wants to keep a balance between its effort to satisfy the low state and that to satisfy the 
high state, because it can make considerable profit in both states. In that case, the retailer wants to 
choose ODM and outsource the product design to induce a low wholesale price, so that it can 
charge a retail price low enough in the low state. On the other hand, when demand uncertainty is 
high, the gap between the low state and the high state is large and the low state becomes so 
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unprofitable to retailer that the retailer would practically forgo the low state and focus on the 
potential high state. The retailer chooses CM to obtain a product with high quality so that it can 
fully utilize the high demand in the high state. Thus, the retailer chooses ODM when demand 
uncertainty is low and chooses CM when demand uncertainty is high. 
This result does not depend on the form of demand uncertainty. Specifically, no matter whether 
the uncertainty is about the total size of the market or consumers’ willingness-to-pay for quality, 
the retailer always makes a higher expected profit with ODM when the degree of uncertainty is 
low, and makes a higher expected profit with CM otherwise. Moreover, if the manufacturer allows 
the retailer to return the unsold products at a discounted price, as long as the return price is not too 
high, the result remains qualitatively the same, that the retailer is better off with ODM when 
demand uncertainty is low, and better off with CM when demand uncertainty is high. Given that 
the return policy essentially shields the retailer against demand uncertainty, if the return price is 
too high, the actual risk caused by demand uncertainty is always low, and the retailer will always 
better off with ODM.  
Third, given that the retailer chooses supply chain optimally, we find that the manufacturer’s 
profit is non-monotone with demand uncertainty. Intuitively, one may expect a firm to make lower 
profit when demand uncertainty is higher. Our analysis shows otherwise. When demand 
uncertainty is low, the retailer takes both the high state and the low state into account when making 
decisions. As demand uncertainty increases, market size in the low state decreases, so the retailer 
selects a lower wholesale price so that it can charge a lower retail price in the low state. As a result, 
the manufacturer’s profit decreases as well. On the other hand, when demand uncertainty is high, 
the retailer mainly focuses on the high state. As demand uncertainty increases, market size in the 
high state also increases, so the retailer selects a higher quality level and is willing to accept a 
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higher wholesale price. Consequently, the manufacturer’s profit increases. Therefore, the 
manufacturer’s profit first increases and then decreases with demand uncertainty. 
Fourth, our study shows that the retailer may, based on demand uncertainty, choose to 
outsource product design to the manufacturer even if it can design the product at a lower cost. In 
ODM, the retailer outsources product design and pays a lower wholesale price than in CM, which 
is desirable when demand uncertainty is low. If the benefit gained from lower wholesale price is 
higher than the extra design cost, the retailer may choose to outsource product design, even if it is 
less cost efficient than designing the product by itself. In contrast to popular belief that a retailer 
should outsource product design to a manufacturer who can design the product at lower cost due 
to technological expertise or economy of scale, our analysis reveals that, even if the manufacturer 
does not have the cost advantage in R&D, the retailer may still optimally choose to outsource the 
product design. 
We conclude this paper by pointing out some directions of future research. First, our study has 
focused on a monopoly; future research may study the effect of quality design outsourcing in 
competitive settings, e.g., duopolistic competition. Second, our analytical framework is limited to 
a one-period game and does not study repeated interactions between the retailer and the 
manufacturer. This dynamic game deserves its own separate study, so we leave it to future research 
to more systematically explore the new insights from such situations. Third, while our research 
assumes that the firms only produce products at one quality level, it may also be interesting to 
investigate the case in which firms produce products with different quality, and see how quality 
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Quality Design Outsourcing under Demand 




Using data from a Chinese manufacturer that supplies a major U.S. textile retailer, we conduct 
an empirical investigation of ODM in a labor-intensive industry. In particular, using the cushion 
industry as a representative category, we study how demand uncertainty affects the retailer’s 
quality design outsourcing decisions, which in turn affects the manufacturer’s profit. 
During the sample period from 2011 to 2018, the manufacturer worked as a supplier of the 
retailer in two types of contracts simultaneously. In the first type of contracts, the retailer designed 
a product, specified the quality requirements (density of the fabric, components of the dye, etc.), 
and requested the manufacturer to produce it. The manufacturer gave the retailer a quote of 
wholesale price, and the retailer decided the quantity to order. In the second type of contracts, the 
retailer offered a wholesale price to the manufacturer, and requested the manufacturer to design 
and produce a product based on the wholesale price. The manufacturer were allowed to choose the 
quality level with a degree of freedom, and the retailer decided the quantity to order accordingly.  
The retailer chooses different supply chains for different products within the cushion category. 
According to the manufacturer, the retailer chooses the first type of contracts for innovative 
products with fashionable designs, for which the retailer is less sensitive to the price but demands 
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the manufacturer to provide products with the required features; the retailer chooses the second 
type of contracts for products with conventional designs, for which the retailer is sensitive about 
the wholesale price since these products are less differentiable from competitors’ products and 
face harsh price competition. We categorize the first type of contracts as CM, and the second type 
as ODM. We compare how different contracts performed under different demand uncertainty. 
We estimate a logit model constructed based on our game-theoretical analysis. We find that 
demand uncertainty is a significant predictor of the retailer’s choice of supply chains. More 
specifically, we find that adjusted shipment in CM has a statistically significantly higher 
coefficient of variation than that in ODM. In other words, the retailer has a higher chance of 
choosing CM with products that have higher demand uncertainty. 
We also estimate a linear regression model to investigate the effects of demand uncertainty on 
the manufacturer’s profit in both CM and ODM. However, we find that the effects are not 
statistically significant. It is possible that the insignificance of the results is due to limited data 
size. This requires further research based on larger sample size to confirm. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present the data that we present 
the data, discuss the variables that we construct for this study, and provides some summary 
statistics. In Section 3.3 we present the conceptual framework. In Section 3.4, we demonstrate the 
estimation results. Section 3.5 concludes the paper with some discussions for future research. All 
proofs are provided in the Appendix. 
3.2 Data 
We use data collected from a Chinese manufacturer that supports a U.S. textile retailer. The 
production of textile products is highly labor-intensive, which is a typical case in many heavily 
outsourced industries. We focus on the cushion category. The dataset includes the transaction 
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records of the cushion products between the manufacturer and the retailer from 2011 to 2018, 
including wholesale price, cost, shipment, revenue, and profit.  
To better understand and classify the outsourcing practices of the retailer, we acquire 
information from the manufacturer about how each order was put by the retailer and fulfilled by 
the manufacturer. In the dataset, there are two types of orders: CM order and ODM order. For an 
order in which the retailer set the desired features of the product (for example, density of the fabric, 
components of the dye, etc.) at the beginning of the negotiation and the manufacturer proposed a 
wholesale price accordingly, we classify it as a CM order. For an order in which the retailer 
proposed a practically non-negotiable wholesale price and allowed the manufacturer a degree of 
freedom to figure out the details of the product (i.e., the manufacturer could use relatively low-end 
fabrics), we classify it as ODM order. Thus, each order is assigned to either the CM group or the 
ODM group based on the negotiation process preceding that transaction. 
Our analysis in the previous sections demonstrate that different demand uncertainty can lead 
to different outsourcing practices of the retailer and different profits of the manufacturer. Thus, we 
construct demand uncertainty as a potential relevant explanatory variable.  
In this study, demand uncertainty is measured by the coefficient of variation of adjusted 
monthly shipment. First, we aggregate the transaction records into monthly data. Second, note that 
the difference of shipment in each month is partly caused by the fact that some months are high 
season and some are low season (for example, February usually has low shipment, and December 
usually has high shipment), we calculate the adjusted shipment with the month controlled. Third, 
we calculate the standard deviation of adjusted monthly shipment with in each year. Fourth, we 
calculate the coefficient of variation of adjusted monthly shipment, which is measured by the ratio 
of the standard deviation to the mean. The coefficient of variation is a better measurement of 
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demand uncertainty than the standard deviation in this case, because two variables with the same 
extent of variation but different means may have different standard deviations. In our dataset, 
ODM orders have higher average shipment than CM, so they may also have higher standard 
deviation even if the extent of variation is low in ODM than in CM. In order to avoid such 
ambiguity, we measure the demand uncertainty of a year by the coefficient of variation of adjusted 
monthly shipment in that year in this study. 
Summary statistics of all the aforementioned variables for CM and ODM are provided in Table 
3.2.1 and 3.2.2 respectively. Due to the limited space, only part of the sampled periods are covered 
in the tables. 
Table 3.2.1 Transactions in CM 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Shipment 
Mean 36516 72832 98967 61748 134250 91925 
SD 35862 56130 103113 58082 96265 86516 
Wholesale Price 
Mean 15.40 14.35 17.04 12.76 13.55 14.07 
SD 3.68 2.50 7.53 1.07 1.20 2.65 
Unit Cost 
Mean 12.55 10.73 13.65 9.67 10.08 11.00 
SD 3.37 1.30 6.07 0.74 0.83 2.19 
Profit 
Mean 103477 272621 305129 211686 484861 283864 
SD 99778 265356 279859 225143 354082 278011 
Adjusted 
Shipment 
Mean 47866 84181 110316 73098 145599 103274 
SD 52528 49140 86550 61866 66044 76108 
Coefficient of Variation 1.0974 0.5837 0.7846 0.8464 0.4536 0.7686 
 
Table 3.2.2 Transactions in ODM 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Shipment 
Mean 110695 157676 175894 149675 188937 165545 
SD 88949 93467 136571 66031 90293 102983 
Wholesale Price 
Mean 12.13 11.83 14.03 10.52 11.22 11.64 
SD 4.35 2.46 5.36 1.15 2.21 2.72 
Unit Cost 
Mean 10.25 8.97 11.56 8.12 8.42 9.27 
SD 3.68 1.73 4.79 0.72 1.35 2.22 
Profit 
Mean 229142 504567 419039 396621 609451 439601 





Mean 190202 237183 255401 229182 268444 245052 
SD 54911 77795 126635 30651 87106 83801 
Coefficient of Variation 0.2887 0.3280 0.4958 0.1337 0.3245 0.3366 
 
As one can see from Table 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, consistent with our expectation, the average 
wholesale price and unit cost (which measures the quality level) both have higher means in CM 
than in ODM. Although ODM has higher average standard deviation of adjusted shipment, this is 
mostly due to the fact that ODM oftentimes have higher shipment than CM. On the other hand, 
CM has higher average coefficient of variation, which indicates that demand uncertainty is higher 
in CM than in ODM. We will formally establish the correlation in the next section. 
3.3 Statistical Model 
Our previous analysis provides two major insights to the ODM under demand uncertainty. 
First, the retailer tends to choose ODM if demand uncertainty is low and choose CM if demand 
uncertainty is high. Second, In ODM, the manufacturer’s profit decreases with demand 
uncertainty; in CM, its profit increases with demand uncertainty. We validate these two predictions 
with different statistical models. 
For the first prediction, we model the retailer’s outsourcing decisions using a logit model. In 
each transaction 𝑖, the retailer makes the decision whether to choose ODM or CM. We denote the 
two possible values of the transaction by 𝑜𝑑𝑚𝑗 = 1 and 𝑜𝑑𝑚𝑗 = 0, respectively. Let 𝑐𝑣𝑗  be the 
coefficient of variation of adjusted shipment, which measures demand uncertainty in the model, in 
transaction 𝑗. The logit model is represented using variable 𝑙𝑗 as follow: 
𝑙𝑗 = 𝑐𝑣𝑗𝛽 + 𝑢𝑗; 
𝑜𝑑𝑚𝑗 = {
1,      𝑙𝑗 > 0




Note that we do not include cost or wholesale price as explanatory variables. In our analytical 
model, product quality (which determines cost) and wholesale price are decided after the retailer’s 
choice of supply chain. Thus, cost, wholesale price, and the manufacturer’s profit are dependent 
on 𝑜𝑑𝑚𝑗 and cannot be explanatory variables of 𝑜𝑑𝑚𝑗 
As predicted by the analytical model, the retailer is expected to respond to different demand 
uncertainty with different outsourcing decisions. Specifically, the retailer may choose ODM for 
products with low demand uncertainty and choose CM for products with high demand uncertainty. 
Thus, we expect demand uncertainty to be negatively correlated with 𝑜𝑑𝑚𝑗, and its coefficient to 
be negative. 
For the second decision, we model the manufacturer’s profit with a linear regression model. 
Beside demand uncertainty, we include wholesale price, cost, shipment as explanatory variables, 
which are denoted by 𝑤𝑗, 𝑐𝑗, 𝑖𝑗 respectively. Thus, the manufacturer’s profit function is as follows: 
𝜋𝑗 = 𝑐𝑣𝑗𝛾1 + 𝑤𝑗𝛾2 + 𝑐𝑗𝛾3 + 𝑖𝑗𝛾4 + 𝑒𝑗 
Intuitively, the manufacturer’s profit should increase with wholesale price and shipment, and 
decrease with cost. Thus, we expect 𝛾2 and 𝛾4 to be positive and 𝛾3 to be negative. Moreover, 
given that our analysis predicts that the manufacturer’s profit will decrease with demand 
uncertainty in ODM and increase with it in CM, we expect 𝛾1 to be negative in ODM and positive 
in CM. We estimate the coefficients in ODM and CM separately. 
3.4 Estimation Results 




Table 3.3 18 




Uncertainty -26.4140*** 5.2986 
Constant 12.9949*** 2.5195 
 
Consistent with our expectation, the coefficient of demand uncertainty is negative and 
significant, i.e., the retailer is less likely to choose ODM for products with high demand 
uncertainty. This result demonstrates that in practice, the retailer may be, at least to some extent, 
aware that it has to choose the supply chain of each order based on demand uncertainty in order to 
maximize its expected profit. In times of low uncertainty, it can go with the “safer choice” of 
ODM, which leads to a product with low risk of overstocking in low state and limited profitability 
in high state; in times of high uncertainty, it has to take more risk and choose CM, which leads to 
a product with higher quality and higher cost, and can result in either large profit or large loss 
depending on the realized demand.  
The estimation results of the linear regression model of the manufacturer’s profit in CM and 
ODM are provided in Table 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 respectively. 
Table 3.4.119 




Uncertainty -116898.4 77985.8 
Wholesale Price 90869.6*** 10276.6 
Cost -90629.7*** 12529.4 
Quantity 2.3902*** 0.1492 
Constant -127225.7 85945.8 
 
                                                 
18 “*” for 𝑝 < 0.1, “**” for 𝑝 < 0.05, “***” for 𝑝 < 0.01. 








Uncertainty -156980.8 163998.1 
Wholesale Price 155933.3*** 13620.9 
Cost -145006.6*** 16301.6 
Quantity 2.0815*** 0.1690 
Constant -323690.0*** 77070.1 
 
Consistent with our expectations, the manufacturer’s profit is positively correlated with 
wholesale price and shipment, and negatively correlated with cost. However, we do not find a 
statistically significant effect of demand uncertainty on the manufacturer’s profit. Given that the 
dataset is aggregated at monthly level, it is possible that the insignificance of the results is caused 
by limit of data size. This requires further research with a more comprehensive dataset to confirm. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Using data from a Chinese manufacturer that designs and produces cushions for a major U.S. 
textile retailer, we conduct an empirical investigation and study how demand uncertainty affects 
the retailer’s quality design outsourcing decisions, which in turn can affect the manufacturer’s 
profit.  
Our analysis shows that demand uncertainty is a significant predictor of the retailer’s choice 
of supply chains. Specifically, we find that adjusted shipment in CM has a statistically significantly 
higher coefficient of variation than that in ODM. In other words, the retailer has a higher chance 
of choosing CM for products with higher demand uncertainty. On the other hand, we find that the 
effects of demand uncertainty on the manufacturer’s profit are not statistically significant. It is 
                                                 
20 “*” for 𝑝 < 0.1, “**” for 𝑝 < 0.05, “***” for 𝑝 < 0.01. 
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possible that the insignificance of the results is due to limited data size. This requires further 
research based on larger sample size to confirm. 
Due to limited access to data, our empirical analysis has focused on the manufacturer’s side. 
With access to the retailer’s data, one may be able to conduct a more comprehensive analysis based 
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Additional Proofs and Analysis 
 
A.1 Managerial Optimism in a Competitive Market 
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1: 
In the benchmark case, we focus only on the parameter region in which the market is fully 
covered in equilibrium and every consumer will buy a product. We solve for the equilibrium 
outcome by backward induction. 
In the last stage of the game, the consumer located at 𝑥𝑗 in segment 𝑗 who makes a purchase 
from firm 𝑖 has a utility of 
𝑈(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑞𝑖𝜃𝑗 − 𝑡𝑑𝑖(𝑥𝑗) − 𝑝𝑖. 
For the consumer who is indifferent between firm 𝑎 and firm 𝑏, her location 𝑥𝑗 is determined 
by 
𝑈(𝑎, 𝑗) = 𝑈(𝑏, 𝑗), 
which is equivalent to: 
𝑞𝑎𝜃𝑗 − 𝑡𝑥𝑗 − 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑞𝑏𝜃𝑗 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥𝑗) − 𝑝𝑏. 





In the previous stage (the second stage of the game), firm 𝑖’s manager maximizes profit:  










Due to the linearity of the demand function, it can be simplified to: 





where 𝜃 = 𝛼𝜃𝐻 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜃𝐿 = 𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜃𝐿. 
Note that managers choose their prices in the second stage, so we take the derivative of firm 





Solving the two first-order conditions simultaneously gives us:  
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑡 +
1
3






This is how managers choose their prices conditional on their quality choices in the first stage. 
Thus, in the first stage, firm 𝑖’s manager maximizes the profit function:  


















Note that firm i’s profit is given by its unit profit margin multiplied by the demand, where 
firm i’s unit profit margin is 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑘𝑞𝑖
2 = 𝑡 +
1
3



















 . Given that the firm’s unit profit margin and its 
demand (quantity sold) must be nonnegative at equilibrium, to maximize 𝜋𝑖 , we should restrict 
firm i’s quality choices (𝑞𝑖) such that the term inside of quadratic of the profit function, i.e. 𝑡 +
1
3





2), must be positive. Thus, we just need to find the 𝑞𝑖 value that gives 
a positive maximum for 𝑡 +
1
3




















Now we examine the conditions under which the market is fully covered in equilibrium in 
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the benchmark case. The consumer in segment 𝑗 who is indifferent from firm 𝑖 and the outside 
option has a utility function  
𝑈(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑞𝑖𝜃𝑗 − 𝑡𝑑𝑖(𝑥𝑗) − 𝑝𝑖 = 0, 





For segment 𝑗 to be fully covered, we need  
∑ 𝑑𝑖(𝑥𝑗)𝑖 = ∑
𝑞𝑖𝜃𝑗−𝑝𝑖
𝑡







, so the high-valuation segment must also be fully covered if 
the low-valuation segment is fully covered, and only ∑
𝑞𝑖𝜃𝐿−𝑝𝑖
𝑡










 into the inequality, we get 
𝜃(2𝜃𝐿 − 𝜃) ≥ 6𝑘𝑡, 
which is equivalent with (𝛼𝜃𝐻 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜃𝐿)((1 + 𝛼)𝜃𝐿 − 𝛼𝜃𝐻) ≥ 6𝑘𝑡. Given that 𝜃𝐻 = 1, 
we can simplify the inequality to 𝜃𝐿
2 − 𝛼2(1 − 𝜃𝐿)
2 ≥ 6𝑘𝑡 . It is easy to see that the LHS is 
increasing with 𝜃𝐿 and decreasing with 𝛼, and the RHS is increasing with 𝑘 and 𝑡. 
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2: 
Note that we assume ?̂? = 1 here. When firm 𝑎’s manager is optimistic and firm 𝑏’s manager 
is realistic, if the market is fully covered, firm 𝑎’s manager maximizes: 





where 𝜃𝐻 = 1, and firm 𝑏’s manager maximizes:  







Again, we solve for the equilibrium by backward induction. In the second stage of the game, 
managers simultaneously choose their respective prices taking both firms’ quality levels as given, 
which gives us  
𝑝𝑎 = 𝑡 +
1
3






𝑝𝑏 = 𝑡 +
1
3






We then plug the price expressions into firms’ objective functions and solve for the optimal 

























. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, since both unit profit 









2) and 𝑡 +
1
3

















The equilibrium prices are  
𝑝𝑎







































Same as in the benchmark case, for the market to be fully covered in equilibrium, it is 





































Simplification of this inequality gives us: 
−(11 − 20𝛼 + 11𝛼2) + 2(11 − 20𝛼 + 11𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 − (9 − 20𝛼 + 11𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2 ≥ 12𝑘𝑡. 
Clearly, the RHS increases with 𝑘 and 𝑡. Moreover, differentiation of the LHS over 𝜃𝐿 gives 
us 2(11 − 20𝛼 + 11𝛼2) + 2(−9 + 20𝛼 − 11𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 , which is linear to 𝜃𝐿 . When 𝜃𝐿 = 0 , it 
equals to 22 − 40𝛼 + 22𝛼2 > 0; when 𝜃𝐿 = 1, it equals to 4 > 0. Thus, given 0 < 𝜃𝐿 < 1, we 
have 2(11 − 20𝛼 + 11𝛼2) + 2(−9 + 20𝛼 − 11𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 > 0 and the LHS is increasing with 𝜃𝐿 . 
Thus, the market will be fully covered in equilibrium if 𝜃𝐿 is relatively large, or if the consumers’ 
sensitivity (𝑡) to horizontal mismatch is low. 
Taking the derivative of the LHS over 𝛼  gives us 20(1 − 2𝜃𝐿 + 𝜃𝐿
2) − 22𝛼(1 − 2𝜃𝐿 +
𝜃𝐿
2) > 0, so the LHS increases with 𝛼 when 𝛼 <
10
11
 and decreases with  𝛼 when 𝛼 >
10
11
. For the 
market to be fully covered, 𝛼 should be neither too high nor too low. 
Note that we only consider two cases: both segments are fully covered, or the high-segment 
is fully covered but the low-segment is not. This is because given that the market is fully covered 
in the benchmark case, the high-valuation segment will in equilibrium always be fully covered 
under unilateral optimism. We show this by contradiction. 
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Suppose that the high segment is not fully covered under unilateral optimism. Then, the low-
valuation segment must not be fully covered, either. As a result, both firms become local 
monopolists in both market segments. 
Thus, firm 𝑎’s optimistic manager maximizes: 





where 𝜃𝐻 = 1, and firm 𝑏’s realistic manager maximizes: 
































< 1 . Note that for the market to be fully covered in the 

















3(1 + 4𝛼 − 3𝛼2 + 2(1 − 𝛼)(2 − 3𝛼)𝜃𝐿 − 3(1 − 𝛼)
2𝜃𝐿
2) < 4(𝜃𝐿
2 − 𝛼2(1 − 𝜃𝐿)
2), 
3 + 12𝛼 − 5𝛼2 + 2(6 − 15𝛼 + 5𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 − (1 − 𝛼)(13 − 5𝛼)𝜃𝐿




= 2(1 − 𝜃𝐿)(6 − 5𝛼 − (9 − 5𝛼)𝜃𝐿) = 0  if 𝛼 =
3(2−3𝜃𝐿)
5(1−𝜃𝐿)


















< 0 if 𝛼 >
3(2−3𝜃𝐿)
5(1−𝜃𝐿)
. Thus, the LHS reaches its minimum at 𝛼 =
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0, where 𝐿𝐻𝑆 = 3 + 12𝜃𝐿 − 13𝜃𝐿
2 > 0 or at 𝛼 = 1, where 𝐿𝐻𝑆 = 10 − 8𝜃𝐿 > 0. Therefore, we 
always have 𝐿𝐻𝑆 > 0 , which leads to a contradiction. As a result, in equilibrium, the high-
valuation segment must always be fully covered under unilateral optimism. 
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1: 
As shown in the proof of Lemma 2, if the market is fully covered under unilateral optimism, 
























If only the high-valuation segment is fully covered under optimism and the low-valuation 
segment is partially covered, firm 𝑏’s manager maximizes the profit function:  








Firm 𝑎’s manager, who believes that all consumers have high valuations, will maximize:  





































< 0, so when firm 𝑎 has an optimistic manager and firm 𝑏 has a realistic manager, 
firm 𝑎’s quality level will increase and firm 𝑏’s quality level will decrease, compared with the 
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benchmark case with both firms having realistic managers. 
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2: 
Recall that in the benchmark case, 𝑝𝑎
∗ = 𝑝𝑏





When firm 𝑎’s manager is optimistic, if the market is fully covered in equilibrium, we have: 
𝑝𝑎




























((4 − 𝛼)𝑡 +
1
4(4−3𝛼)2𝑘
((192 − 448𝛼 + 350𝛼2 − 91𝛼3) − 2(1 − 𝛼)(64 − 106𝛼 +










(−𝛼(16 − 36𝛼 + 17𝛼2) + 2𝛼(1 − 𝛼)(34 − 25𝛼)𝜃𝐿 + 32(1 −
𝛼)2(5 − 3𝛼)𝜃𝐿
2)). 
We first consider the case of full coverage. 
The change of firm 𝑎’s price is:  
















So, firm 𝑎’s price will increase unambiguously under unilateral optimism.   
The change of firm 𝑏’s price is:  
Δ𝑝𝑏



















Given 𝜃 < 1, firm 𝑏’s price will increase if 𝜃 <
2
3
 and decrease otherwise. However, recall 
that 𝜃 = 𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)𝜃𝐿, so 𝜃 <
2
3
 is equivalent to 𝜃𝐿 <
2−3𝛼
3(1−𝛼)
. As demonstrated in Lemma 2, the 
condition for the market to be fully covered under unilateral optimism is:  
−(11 − 20𝛼 + 11𝛼2) + 2(11 − 20𝛼 + 11𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 − (9 − 20𝛼 + 11𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2 ≥ 12𝑘𝑡. 
Recall that the LHS is increasing with 𝜃𝐿, so substituting 𝜃𝐿 <
2−3𝛼
3(1−𝛼)
 into the LHS gives us:  







Thus, given that the market is fully covered under unilateral optimism, firm 𝑏’s price will not 
increase. 
Now, we consider the case of partial coverage.  In this case, note that the difference between 






(1 − 𝛼) (8(4 − 3𝛼)2𝑘𝑡 + ((37 − 17𝜃𝐿 − 16𝜃𝐿
2)𝛼2 − 24(5 − 3𝜃𝐿 −
2𝜃𝐿
2)𝛼 + 32(3 − 2𝜃𝐿 − 𝜃𝐿
2)))>0. 
So, as long as firm 𝑏’s price under optimism is higher than that in the benchmark case, firm 
𝑎’s price is higher than that in the benchmark case as well. Thus, in order to show that both firms’ 
prices can increase under unilateral optimism, we only have to show that firm 𝑏’s price can 
increase. 
When firm 𝑎 has an optimistic manager and the market is not fully covered under optimism, 























(−𝛼(16 − 36𝛼 + 17𝛼2) + 2𝛼(1 −
𝛼)(34 − 25𝛼)𝜃𝐿 + 32(1 − 𝛼)
2(5 − 3𝛼)𝜃𝐿





For firm 𝑏’s price to increase under optimism, we need Δ𝑝𝑏
∗
′ > 0, which is equivalent to  
(1 − 𝛼)(15(1 − 𝜃𝐿)
2𝛼3 − (12 − 38𝜃𝐿 − 37𝜃𝐿
2 + 288𝑘𝑡)𝛼2 − 4(4 − 𝜃𝐿 + 45𝜃𝐿
2 − 192𝑘𝑡)𝛼 +
128(𝜃𝐿
2 − 4𝑘𝑡)) > 0. 
Solving this equation gives us: 
𝑘 > 0, 
0 < 𝛼 <
1
21
(32 − 8√2), 
−2𝛼−19𝛼2+15𝛼3+√2048𝛼−1340𝛼2−3412𝛼3+3685𝛼4−945𝛼5
128−180𝛼+37𝛼2+15𝛼3
< 𝜃𝐿 < 1, 






Note that the set of parameters satisfying these inequalities and the coverage conditions is 
non-empty. We have shown that firm 𝑏’s price, and thus firm 𝑎’s price, can both increase under 
unilateral optimism when the market is not partially covered. This completes the proof of 
Proposition 2. 
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3: 
Note that according to Proof of Lemma 2, when the market is fully covered under unilateral 















Firm 𝑎’s profit in this case is less than that in the benchmark case (
𝑡
2
), so there cannot be a 
win-win equilibrium outcome if the market is fully covered under optimism. 
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Next, we consider the case in which the market is partially covered under optimism. 
Note that firm 𝑎’s total profit includes two parts: profits from high-valuation consumers, and 











((4 − 𝑎)𝑡 +
1
4(4−3𝛼)2𝑘
(2(3 − 2𝛼)(32 − 56𝛼 + 25𝛼2) −
2(1 − 𝛼)(64 − 106𝛼 + 43𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 + 64(2 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝛼)
2𝜃𝐿)))
2








((4 − 𝑎)𝑡 +
1
4(4−3𝛼)2𝑘
(2(3 − 2𝛼)(32 − 56𝛼 + 25𝛼2) − 2(1 − 𝛼)(64 − 106𝛼 +





















, which is equivalent to: 
1
8−5𝛼
((4 − 𝛼)𝑡 +
1
4(4−3𝛼)2𝑘
(2(3 − 2𝛼)(32 − 56𝛼 + 25𝛼2) − 2(1 − 𝛼)(64 − 106𝛼 +
43𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 + 64(2 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝛼)
2𝜃𝐿
2)) > 𝑡√𝛼, 
(4 − 𝛼)𝑡 +
1
4(4−3𝛼)2𝑘
(2(3 − 2𝛼)(32 − 56𝛼 + 25𝛼2) − 2(1 − 𝛼)(64 − 106𝛼 + 43𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 +
64(2 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝛼)2𝜃𝐿
2) > (8 − 5𝛼)𝑡√𝛼, 











































































Let 𝑡∗ = min{𝑡𝑎
∗ , 𝑡𝑏
∗}, then we have both firms will be better off under optimism if 𝑡 < 𝑡∗. 
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 4: 
When both firms have optimistic managers, firm 𝑖’s manager maximizes: 























If the market is fully covered under bilateral optimism, firm 𝑖’s realized profit is: 











Thus, firm 𝑖’s profits are the same as in the benchmark case if the market is fully covered 
under bilateral optimism. 
Next, we consider the case in which the market is partially covered. Since neither firm’s 





∗ = 𝑡 +
1
4𝑘
 in this case. Firm 𝑖’s 
profit is: 













∗ = 𝑡 +
1
4𝑘
 gives us: 
𝜋𝑖
∗ = 𝑡 (𝛼
1
2










< 1𝑖 . 









Substituting this inequality into the profit function gives us: 
𝜋𝑖
∗ = 𝑡 (𝛼
1
2





 )< 𝑡 (𝛼
1
2
+ (1 − 𝛼)
1
2




Thus, firm 𝑖’s profit is lower than that in the benchmark case. Both firms will be worse off. 
In summary, both firms will be weakly worse off under bilateral optimism. 
A.1.7 Analysis of Bilateral Optimism as a Possible Equilibrium: 
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Here we show that (𝑂, 𝑂)  cannot be an equilibrium outcome when firms endogenously 
choose which type of managers to hire. 
For (𝑂, 𝑂) to be an equilibrium, we need 𝜋𝑏
∗  to be higher in (𝑂, 𝑂) than in (𝑂, 𝑅). Note that 













; meanwhile, Proposition 




 in (𝑂, 𝑂). Thus, if the market is fully covered in (𝑂, 𝑅), firm 𝑏 will be worse off 
by switching to (𝑂, 𝑂), and (𝑂, 𝑂) cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, (𝑂, 𝑂) can possibly be an 
equilibrium outcome only if the market is not fully covered in (𝑂, 𝑅). This leaves us with two 
cases: (1) the market is fully covered in (𝑂, 𝑂), and partially covered in (𝑂, 𝑅); (2) the market is 
partially covered in (𝑂, 𝑂) and (𝑂, 𝑅). 
Case 1. Market is fully covered in (𝑂, 𝑂), and partially covered in (𝑂, 𝑅). 




















, which leads to 
1
2









< 1𝑖 , which is 
1
8−5𝛼





) < 1 . 


















, which gives us 
1
2






















< 0 , so when 𝜃𝐿 =
1
2












. Thus, for the market to be 


































, which (given 
1
2
< 𝜃𝐿 < 2 − √2 ) 






Given that 𝑘𝑡 <
2𝜃𝐿−1
6








. Note that 
𝜕𝐿𝐻𝑆
𝜕𝛼








 takes its minimum when 𝛼 =
8−2√7
9















), which is decreasing with 𝜃𝐿. Thus, when 𝜃𝐿 = 2 −








= 0.027339 > 0. 
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As a result, as long as 𝛼 <
8−2√7
9
 (which is the necessary condition for the market to be 








 and firm 𝑏  is 
worse off in (𝑂, 𝑂) than in (𝑂, 𝑅). Therefore, (𝑂, 𝑂) cannot be an equilibrium if the market is fully 
covered in (𝑂, 𝑂), and partially covered in (𝑂, 𝑅). 
Case 2. The market is partially covered in (𝑂, 𝑂) and (𝑂, 𝑅). 
Note that in this case, when the market is partially covered in (𝑂, 𝑂), it is possible that the 
low-valuation segment is partially covered or not covered at all (low-valuation consumers do not 
make purchases). We analyze both cases separately. 
In the first case, the low-valuation segment is partially covered in (𝑂, 𝑂). 


















< 1𝑖 . As we have already 
shown, this gives us: 

























In (𝑂, 𝑂), 𝜋𝑏 = 𝛼
𝑡
2






. For firm 𝑏 to be 






















, 𝑘𝑡 > 𝑔4 =
1
16(4−3𝛼)(−32+56𝛼−21𝛼2)
(256 − 512𝛼 + 316𝛼2 − 63𝛼3 −
2(256 − 512𝛼 + 316𝛼2 − 63𝛼3)𝜃𝐿 + 48𝛼(1 − 𝛼)(2 − 𝛼)𝜃𝐿
2 + (8 − 5𝛼)(1024 − 2816𝛼 +
2640𝛼2 − 952𝛼3 + 105𝛼4 − 4(1024 − 2816𝛼 + 2640𝛼2 − 952𝛼3 + 105𝛼4)𝜃𝐿 + 4(1024 −
2496𝛼 + 1824𝛼2 − 288𝛼3 − 63𝛼4)𝜃𝐿
2 + 64𝛼(40 − 102𝛼 + 83𝛼2 − 21𝛼3)𝜃𝐿
3 + 256(1 −
𝛼)2(4 − 8𝛼 + 3𝛼2)𝜃𝐿
4)
1






(−256 + 512𝛼 −
316𝛼2 + 63𝛼3 + 2(256 − 512𝛼 + 316𝛼2 − 63𝛼3)𝜃𝐿 − 48𝛼(1 − 𝛼)(2 − 𝛼)𝜃𝐿
2 − (8 −
5𝛼)(1024 − 2816𝛼 + 2640𝛼2 − 952𝛼3 + 105𝛼4 − 4(1024 − 2816𝛼 + 2640𝛼2 − 952𝛼3 +
105𝛼4)𝜃𝐿 + 4(1024 − 2496𝛼 + 1824𝛼
2 − 288𝛼3 − 63𝛼4)𝜃𝐿
2 + 64𝛼(40 − 102𝛼 + 83𝛼2 −
21𝛼3)𝜃𝐿
3 + 256(1 − 𝛼)2(4 − 8𝛼 + 3𝛼2)𝜃𝐿
4)
1




512𝛼 − 316𝛼2 + 63𝛼3 + 2(256 − 512𝛼 + 316𝛼2 − 63𝛼3)𝜃𝐿 − 48𝛼(1 − 𝛼)(2 − 𝛼)𝜃𝐿
2 +
(8 − 5𝛼)(1024 − 2816𝛼 + 2640𝛼2 − 952𝛼3 + 105𝛼4 − 4(1024 − 2816𝛼 + 2640𝛼2 −
952𝛼3 + 105𝛼4)𝜃𝐿 + 4(1024 − 2496𝛼 + 1824𝛼
2 − 288𝛼3 − 63𝛼4)𝜃𝐿
2 + 64𝛼(40 − 102𝛼 +
83𝛼2 − 21𝛼3)𝜃𝐿




Combining these conditions together, we have 𝑘𝑡 > 𝑔∗ = max {𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔3, 𝑔4}  when 𝛼 >
4(7−√7)
21
, and 𝑘𝑡 > 𝑔∗∗ = max {𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔3, 𝑔5} when 𝛼 <
4(7−√7)
21
. However, for the market to be 





, where 𝑔0 < 𝑔
∗ and 𝑔0 <
𝑔∗∗. Thus, firm 𝑏 is worse off in (𝑂, 𝑂) than in (𝑂, 𝑅) if the low-valuation segment is partially 
covered in (𝑂, 𝑂). Therefore, (𝑂, 𝑂) cannot be an equilibrium in this case. 
In the second case, the low-valuation segment is not covered in equilibrium in (𝑂, 𝑂). 
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< 0, which leads 




In (𝑂, 𝑅), the market coverage conditions still require 𝑘𝑡 > 𝑔2 and 𝑘𝑡 > 𝑔3. 




























Thus, we have 𝑘𝑡 > ℎ∗ = max {ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑔2, 𝑔3}, where ℎ
∗ > 𝑔0 , so firm 𝑏  is worse off in 
(𝑂, 𝑂) than in (𝑂, 𝑅) if the low-valuation segment is not covered in (𝑂, 𝑂). Therefore, (𝑂, 𝑂) 
cannot be an equilibrium in this case, either. 
As a result, in all the cases discussed above, firm 𝑏 is worse off in (𝑂, 𝑂) than in (𝑂, 𝑅). 
Therefore, (𝑂, 𝑂) cannot be an equilibrium. 
A.1.8 Proof of Proposition 5: 
In the benchmark case, both firms have realistic managers who maximize: 





















When firm 𝑎 has an optimistic manager who believes that the probability density function of 

















































It is easy to see that Δ𝑝𝑎∗ > 0, Δ𝑝𝑏
∗ > 0, Δ𝜋𝑎∗ > 0, and Δ𝜋𝑏
∗ > 0. Both firms’ prices and profits 
will increase under managerial optimism.  
A.1.9 Analysis of Exogenous Quality under Optimism: 
If product quality is exogenous, managers maximize firms’ profits through pricing decisions. 
For simplicity, we assume full equilibrium coverage for this extension. In the benchmark case in 
which there is no managerial optimism, as shown in the Proof of Lemma 1, firm 𝑖’s manager 
maximizes: 





Solving for the optimal price gives us firm 𝑖’s optimal price and profit:  
𝑝𝑖
∗ = 𝑡 +
1
3























When firm 𝑎 has an optimistic manager and firm 𝑏 has a realistic manager, firm 𝑏’s profit 
function does not change and firm 𝑎’s manager maximizes: 





The equilibrium prices and profits are: 
𝑝𝑎
∗ = 𝑡 +
1
3







∗ = 𝑡 +
1
3


















































































































When 𝑞𝑎 = 𝑞𝑏, Δ𝑝𝑎∗ = Δ𝑝𝑏
∗ = Δ𝜋𝑎∗ = Δ𝜋𝑏
∗ = 0, so managerial optimism does not affect firms’ 
prices and profits. 
When 𝑞𝑎 < 𝑞𝑏, we have Δ𝑝𝑎∗ < 0 and Δ𝑝𝑏
∗ < 0, so both firms’ prices will decrease. 
When 𝑞𝑎 > 𝑞𝑏, we have Δ𝑝𝑎∗ > 0 and Δ𝑝𝑏
∗ > 0, so both firms’ prices will increase. 
101 
 
Now we examine firms’ profits. 




(𝑞𝑎 − 𝑞𝑏)(1 − 𝜃) ((𝑡 +
1
3





2)) + (𝑡 +
1
3






Note that (𝑡 +
1
3





2)) > 0  and (𝑡 +
1
3






2)) > 0 since they are firm 𝑏’s equilibrium unit profit margins, so (𝑡 +
1
3





2)) + (𝑡 +
1
3





2)) > 0 . Thus, we have Δ𝜋𝑏
∗ > 0  if and only if 
𝑞𝑎 − 𝑞𝑏 > 0. Firm 𝑏’s profit will increase if 𝑞𝑎 > 𝑞𝑏, and will decrease if 𝑞𝑏 > 𝑞𝑎. 






(𝑞𝑎 − 𝑞𝑏)(1 − 𝜃) ((𝑡 +
1
3









𝑞𝑏)(1 − 𝜃)))), so Δ𝜋𝑎∗ > 0 is equivalent to  
1
3
(𝑞𝑎 − 𝑞𝑏)(1 − 𝜃) ((𝑡 +
1
3





2)) − 2 (
1
3
(𝑞𝑎 − 𝑞𝑏)(1 − 𝜃))) > 0. 
If 𝑞𝑎 < 𝑞𝑏, we need 𝑡 +
1
3





2) < 2 (
1
3
(𝑞𝑎 − 𝑞𝑏)(1 − 𝜃)) < 0, which 
cannot be true, since 𝑡 +
1
3





2)  is the firm 𝑎 ’s equilibrium unit profit 
margin. Thus, firm 𝑎’s profit will decrease if 𝑞𝑎 < 𝑞𝑏. 
If 𝑞𝑎 > 𝑞𝑏 , we need 𝑡 +
1
3





2) > 2 (
1
3
(𝑞𝑎 − 𝑞𝑏)(1 − 𝜃)) , which is 








(𝑞𝑎 − 𝑞𝑏)(3𝜃 − 2). When 𝑡 is large enough, firm 𝑎’s profit will 
increase under managerial optimism. 
A.1.10 Analysis of Managerial Pessimism: 
102 
 
We first examine the case of unilateral pessimism. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
firm 𝑎’s manager is realistic and firm 𝑏’s manager is pessimistic. We first consider the case in 
which the market is fully covered in equilibrium under pessimism, where firm 𝑎 ’s manager 
maximizes:  





Firm 𝑏’s manager maximizes: 
















The equilibrium prices are:  
𝑝𝑎









































, so firm 𝑏 is always worse off when the market is fully covered 
under pessimism. 
Now we demonstrate that the market is always fully covered under unilateral pessimism. Note 
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3𝛼) + (12 − 31𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 + (10 − 6𝛼 + 29𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2) . Since  
1−𝜃𝐿
12(1+2𝜃𝐿)
> 0 , we have 
1−𝜃𝐿
12(1+2𝜃𝐿)
(2𝛼(1 + 3𝛼) + (12 − 31𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 + (10 − 6𝛼 + 29𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2) > 0 if  2𝛼(1 + 3𝛼) + (12 −
31𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 + (10 − 6𝛼 + 29𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2 > 0.  









12 − 31𝛼2 + 2(10 − 6𝛼 + 29𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 ≥ 0; if 𝛼 > √
12
31








In the first case, 2𝛼(1 + 3𝛼) + (12 − 31𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 + (10 − 6𝛼 + 29𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2  will be at its 
minimum when 𝜃𝐿 = 0 , where 2𝛼(1 + 3𝛼) + (12 − 31𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿 + (10 − 6𝛼 + 29𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2 =
2𝛼(1 + 3𝛼) > 0. In the second case, 2𝛼(1 + 3𝛼) + (12 − 31𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 + (10 − 6𝛼 + 29𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2 is 
at its minimum when 𝜃𝐿 =
31𝛼2−12
2(10−6𝛼+29𝛼2)













> 0. Therefore, we always have 2𝛼(1 + 3𝛼) + (12 − 31𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 +
(10 − 6𝛼 + 29𝛼2)𝜃𝐿
2 > 0, which means 2𝛼(1 + 3𝛼) + (12 − 31𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 + (10 − 6𝛼 + 29𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2 
is increasing with 𝜃𝐿. 
Thus, 2𝛼(1 + 3𝛼) + (12 − 31𝛼2)𝜃𝐿 + (10 − 6𝛼 + 29𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2  takes its minimum when 
𝜃𝐿 = 0 , so 2𝛼(1 + 3𝛼) + (12 − 31𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿 + (10 − 6𝛼 + 29𝛼
2)𝜃𝐿
2 > 2𝛼(1 + 3𝛼) > 0 . 










≥ 𝑘𝑡 . As a 
result, the market is always fully covered under unilateral pessimism, and the pessimistic manager 
is always worse off. 
Now we study the case of bilateral pessimism. Given that both managers believe that all 
consumers have low valuations, the low-valuation segment is always fully covered under bilateral 
pessimism, so the whole market will be fully covered. Thus, firm 𝑖’s manager maximizes: 






















Both firms’ profits remain unchanged under bilateral pessimism. Therefore, managerial 
pessimism always makes the pessimistic manager weakly worse off, and cannot lead to a win-win 
outcome. 
Lastly, we consider the case of (𝑂, 𝑃), when firm 𝑎 has an optimistic manager and firm 𝑏 has 
a pessimistic manager. We focus on the case in which the market is fully covered in equilibrium. 
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Given that both firms are weakly worse off in the state of (𝑂, 𝑂) and (𝑃, 𝑃) compared with 


















≥ 1𝑖  (the condition for the market to be fully 
covered in (𝑂, 𝑃)) gives us: 
𝑘 > 0, 
11−√22
9
< 𝜃𝐿 < 1, 













When these conditions are satisfied, both firms make higher profits in (𝑂, 𝑃) than in (𝑂, 𝑂) 
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and (𝑃, 𝑃), and asymmetric managerial bias in the market is better than symmetric bias. 
Moreover, neither firm has incentives to deviate from (𝑂, 𝑃) to (𝑂, 𝑂) or (𝑃, 𝑃), so (𝑂, 𝑃) is 
an equilibrium outcome. 
A.2 Quality Design Outsourcing under Demand Uncertainty: 
An Analytical Study 
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1: 
In the benchmark case, there is no demand uncertainty and the market size is normalized to 
1. We solve for the equilibrium outcomes in each supply chain separately and we do it through 
backward induction. 
In CM, in the last stage of the game, the retailer’s profit function is:  
𝜋𝑅
𝐶 = (𝑝𝐶 − 𝑤𝐶)𝑠𝐶, 
where 𝑝𝐶 is the retail price, 𝑤𝐶 is the wholesale price, and 𝑠𝐶 is the sales volume. Given that 
there is no demand uncertainty, the retailer can fully anticipate the demand, and therefore will not 
have any unsold inventory. Thus, in the bench mark case, the sales volume equals to the demand, 
𝑑𝐶. 
When consumers make a purchase, the threshold consumer who is indifferent between 
making a purchase and the outside option has utility:  
𝜃𝐶𝑞𝐶 − 𝑝𝐶 = 0. 
Consumers whose willingness-to-pay for quality is higher than that of the threshold consumer 
will make purchase. This gives us the demand:  












Since the retailer chooses the retail price in the last stage, we take derivative of 𝜋𝑅
𝐶  with 








In the second-to-last stage of the game, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price. Its 
profit function is:  
𝜋𝑀






We take derivative of 𝜋𝑀











In the first stage of the game, the retailer decides the quality level. Plugging 𝑝𝐶 and 𝑤𝐶 into 







Taking derivative of 𝜋𝑅

































































(339 − 59√33). 
We can also calculate the numerical results accordingly: 
Table 2.1 Equilibrium Outcome in Benchmark Case 
  Integrated ODM CM 
Quality 0.3333 0.2019 0.3333 
Wholesale Price - 0.1095 0.2222 
Retail Price 0.2222 0.1557 0.2778 
Demand 0.3333 0.2287 0.1667 
Retailer Profit - 0.0105 0.0093 
Retailer Share - 40.18% 33.33% 
Manufacturer 
Profit - 0.0157 0.0185 
Manufacturer 
Share - 59.82% 66.67% 
Channel Profit 0.0370 0.0263 0.0278 
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 1: 
In order to find the optimal supply chain for the retailer, we need to calculate the retailer’s 
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expected profit in each supply chain. 
In CM, in the fourth stage of the game, the retailer chooses retail price. It has profit function: 
𝜋𝑅
𝐶 = 𝑝𝐶𝑠𝐶 − 𝑤𝐶𝑖𝐶, 
Where the sales volume 𝑠𝐶 = min {𝑖𝐶 , 𝑑𝐶}. Same as in the benchmark case, the threshold 
customer’s willingness-to-pay for quality is 
𝑝𝐶
𝑞𝐶
, so demand for the product is: 




Since the demand is uncertainty, it is possible that the retailer overstocked in the previous 
stage and cannot sell all the products in the last stage. 
If 𝑑𝐶 < 𝑖𝐶  and the retailer does not sell all the inventory, the retailer’s profit function is: 
𝜋𝑅
𝐶 = 𝑝𝐶𝑑𝐶 − 𝑤𝐶𝑖𝐶 = 𝑝𝐶𝑁 (1 −
𝑝𝐶
𝑞𝐶
) − 𝑤𝐶𝑖𝐶. 
Maximizing the retailer’s profit function with respect to 𝑝𝐶 gives us: 𝑝𝐶 =
𝑞𝐶
2




If 𝑑𝐶 ≥ 𝑖𝐶  and the retailer sells out all the inventory, the retailer’s profit function is: 
𝜋𝑅
𝐶 = (𝑝𝐶 − 𝑤𝐶)𝑖𝐶, 
s.t. 𝑑𝐶 = 𝑁 (1 −
𝑝𝐶
𝑞𝐶
) ≥ 𝑖𝐶. 
Maximizing the retailer’s profit function under constraint gives us: 𝑝𝐶 = (1 −
𝑖𝐶
𝑁𝐶
) 𝑞𝐶  and 
𝑑𝐶 = 𝑖𝐶. 
Since the retailer’s profit function is different in these two cases, we need to discuss the two 
cases separately. 
Note that it is not optimal for the retailer to choose an inventory level that will not be sold out 
in both the low state and the high state, because the retailer can always slightly reduce the inventory 
level to a degree that it still will not be sold out in both states, and obtain the same revenue but at 
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lower total cost. Hence, we need to look at two cases: (1) the products are sold out in both states, 
and (2) the products are sold out in the high state but not the low state. 
Case 1: the products are sold out in both states. 
In the high state, we have 𝑑𝐶 = 𝑁 (1 −
𝑝𝐶
𝑞𝐶
) = (1 + 𝛿) (1 −
𝑝𝐶
𝑞𝐶
) = 𝑖𝐶, so the retail price is: 




In the low state, we have 𝑑𝐶 = 𝑁 (1 −
𝑝𝐶
𝑞𝐶
) = (1 − 𝛿) (1 −
𝑝𝐶
𝑞𝐶
) = 𝑖𝐶, so the retail price is: 


















) 𝑖𝐶 − 𝑤𝐶𝑖𝐶, 
𝜋𝑅
𝐶 = (𝑞𝐶 (1 −
𝑖𝐶
1−𝛿2
) − 𝑤𝐶) 𝑖𝐶. 




In the second stage, the manufacturer chooses wholesale price. Its profit function is: 
𝜋𝑀











Plugging 𝑝𝐶, 𝑖𝐶, and 𝑤𝐶 into the retailer’s profit function, we get the retailer’s profit function 





(1 − 𝛿2)𝑞𝐶(1 − 𝑞𝐶)2. 































Case 2: the products are sold out in the high state but not the low state. 
In the high state, the products are sold out and we have  𝑑𝐶 = 𝑁 (1 −
𝑝𝐶
𝑞𝐶




) = 𝑖𝐶, so the retail price is: 















































Plugging 𝑝𝐶, 𝑖𝐶, and 𝑤𝐶 into the retailer’s profit function, we get the retailer’s profit function 







𝑞𝐶 (5 − 3𝛿 − 4𝑞𝐶(1 + 𝛿) + 4𝑞𝐶
2
(1 + 𝛿)). 





































𝛿 < 1. Therefore, in CM, the retailer’s profit function is: 
𝜋𝑅
𝐶 ∗ = {
1−𝛿2
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≤ 𝛿 < 1
. 
We can find the equilibrium profit of the retailer in ODM in the same way. 
Now we compare the retailer’s equilibrium profit in CM and that in ODM, and find that 
𝜋𝑅
𝐶 ∗ > 𝜋𝑅
𝑂∗ if and only if 
11
13
≤ 𝛿 ≤ 1. Thus, there exists 𝛿∗ =
11
13
 such that the retailer is better off 
with ODM when 𝛿 < 𝛿∗, and better off with CM when 𝛿 > 𝛿∗. 
Given that the retailer chooses the optimal supply chain under any given demand uncertainty, 
































≤ 𝛿 < 1
. 
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2: 
When 0 < 𝛿 <
11
13






Taking derivative of 𝜋𝑀







= −0.0314𝛿 < 0. 
Thus, when 0 < 𝛿 <
11
13











Taking derivative of 𝜋𝑀








Note that 1 + 𝛿 + √−11 + 2𝛿 + 13𝛿2 > 0  and 864(1 + 𝛿)2√−11 + 2𝛿 + 13𝛿2 > 0 , so 




 depends on that of 25 + 13𝛿2 − 23√−11 + 2𝛿 + 13𝛿2 + 𝛿(38 −




≤ 𝛿 < 1, −11 + 2𝛿 + 13𝛿2 is increasing with 𝛿, so we have −11 + 2𝛿 + 13𝛿2 <
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4. Thus, we have: 
25 + 13𝛿2 − 23√−11 + 2𝛿 + 13𝛿2 + 𝛿(38 − 11√−11 + 2𝛿 + 13𝛿2)  
= 25 + 38𝛿 + 13𝛿2 − (23 + 11𝛿)√−11 + 2𝛿 + 13𝛿2  
> 25 + 38𝛿 + 13𝛿2 − (23 + 11𝛿)√4  
= −21 + 16𝛿 + 13𝛿2  
> −21 + 16 ∗
11
13










Hence, we show that 25 + 13𝛿2 − 23√−11 + 2𝛿 + 13𝛿2 + 𝛿(38 −




. Therefore, when 
11
13
≤ 𝛿 < 1 , the manufacturer’s 
profit increases with demand uncertainty. 
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 3: 
In this case, the retailer needs to pay a fixed cost, 𝐹, of research and development. In ODM, 
when 0 < 𝛿 <
11
13








In CM, when 0 < 𝛿 <
11
13




























= 0.0013(1 − 𝛿2) > 0, so we have Δ𝜋𝑅
∗ > 0 if: 




Therefore, as long as the retailer’s development cots is not significantly lower than that of the 
manufacturer, the retailer will choose ODM and let the manufacturer design product quality, even 
if the manufacturer has a higher design cost. 
A.2.5 Analysis of Uncertainty of Consumers’ Willingness-To-Pay: 
In the last stage of the game, a consumer will purchase the product if 𝑢𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗𝑞 − 𝑝 ≥ 0. High-
valuation consumers will make purchase if 𝑢𝐻 = 𝜃𝐻𝑞 − 𝑝 ≥ 0, and low-valuation consumers will 
maker purchase if 𝑢𝐿 = 𝜃𝐿𝑞 − 𝑝 ≥ 0. Since 𝜃𝐻 > 𝜃𝐿, high-valuation consumers will always make 
purchase if low-valuation consumers maker purchase. Thus, the retailer has two options when 
choosing the retail price: to choose a price that both high-valuation consumers will buy, or to 
choose a price that only the high-valuation consumers will buy. 
If the retailer chooses a price that both high-valuation consumers and low-valuation 
consumers will buy, its profit function is: 
𝜋𝑅 = 𝑝 − 𝑤 s.t. 𝑢𝐿 = 𝜃𝐿𝑞 − 𝑝 ≥ 0. 
To maximize its profit, the retailer would set 𝑝 = 𝜃𝐿𝑞 and have profit: 




If the retailer chooses a price that only the high-valuation consumers will buy, in the low 
state, its profit function is: 
𝜋𝑅 = (𝑝 − 𝑤)𝛼 s.t. 𝑢𝐻 = 𝜃𝐻𝑞 − 𝑝 ≥ 0. 
To maximize its profit, the retailer would set 𝑝 = 𝜃𝐻𝑞 and have profit: 
𝜋𝑅 = (𝜃𝐻𝑞 − 𝑤)𝛼 = (𝑞 − 𝑤)𝛼. 
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In the high state, its profit function is: 
𝜋𝑅 = (𝑝 − 𝑤)(1 − 𝛼) s.t. 𝑢𝐻 = 𝜃𝐻𝑞 − 𝑝 ≥ 0. 
To maximize its profit, the retailer would set 𝑝 = 𝜃𝐻𝑞 and have profit: 
𝜋𝑅 = (𝜃𝐻𝑞 − 𝑤)(1 − 𝛼) = (𝑞 − 𝑤)(1 − 𝛼). 




− 𝑤 ≥ (𝑞 − 𝑤)(1 − 𝛼), which is equivalent to 𝑤 ≤
𝑞(4𝛼−3)
4𝛼
. Given that 0 < 𝛼 <
1
2
, we have 𝑤 ≤
𝑞(4𝛼−3)
4𝛼
< 0, which is impossible. Thus, in the high state when there are more 
high-valuation consumers, the retailer will choose a price that only the high-valuation consumers 
will buy. 
Note that previous analysis apply to both CM and ODM. Now, we investigate CM and ODM 
separately. 
In CM, in the second stage of the game, the manufacturer chooses 𝑤. No matter what 𝑤𝐶 it 
chooses, in the high state, the retailer will always choose 𝑝𝐶 = 𝜃𝐻𝑞
𝐶 = 𝑞𝐶, so the manufacturer 
has profit: 
𝜋𝑀
𝐶 = (𝑤𝐶 − 𝑞𝐶
2
) 𝛼 s.t. 𝑤𝐶 ≤ 𝑝𝐶 = 𝑞𝐶. 
In the low state, if the manufacturer chooses 𝑤𝐶 ≤
𝑞𝐶(1−4𝛼)
4(1−𝛼)
, it will have profit: 
𝜋𝑀
𝐶 = 𝑤𝐶 − 𝑞𝐶
2




To maximize its profit, the manufacturer will choose 𝑤𝐶 =
𝑞𝐶(1−4𝛼)
4(1−𝛼)






















If the manufacturer chooses 𝑤𝐶 >
𝑞𝐶(1−4𝛼)
4(1−𝛼)
, it will have profit: 
𝜋𝑀
𝐶 = (𝑤𝐶 − 𝑞𝐶
2
) 𝛼 s.t. 𝑤𝐶 ≤ 𝑞𝐶 . 
To maximize its profit, the manufacturer will choose 𝑤𝐶 = 𝑞, and its expected profit is: 
𝜋𝑀
𝐶 = (𝑞𝐶 − 𝑞𝐶
2
) 𝛼. 




















) 𝛼 ≥ (𝑞𝐶 − 𝑞𝐶
2
) 𝛼, which gives us: 
0 < 𝛼 <
1
8
(11 − √105), 







(11 − √105) , or 0 < 𝛼 <
1
8




manufacturer chooses 𝑤𝐶 = 𝑞𝐶 ; when 0 < 𝛼 <
1
8












(11 − √105) , the manufacturer always chooses 𝑤𝐶 = 𝑞𝐶 , which gives the 
retailer profit 𝜋𝑅
𝐶 = (𝑝𝐶 − 𝑤𝐶)𝛼 = (𝑞𝐶 − 𝑞𝐶)𝛼 = 0. 
When 0 < 𝛼 <
1
8
(11 − √105), if 𝑞𝐶 >
1−11𝛼+4𝛼2
4−8𝛼+4𝛼2
, the manufacturer still chooses 𝑤𝐶 = 𝑞𝐶, 
which gives the retailer profit 𝜋𝑅
𝐶 = 0. If 0 < 𝑞𝐶 ≤
1−11𝛼+4𝛼2
4−8𝛼+4𝛼2
, the manufacturer chooses 𝑤𝐶 =
𝑞𝐶(1−4𝛼)
4(1−𝛼)


























To maximize its profit, the retailer would set 𝑞𝐶 =
1−11𝛼+4𝛼2
4−8𝛼+4𝛼2






Thus, in CM, the retailer’s expected profit is: 
𝜋𝑅
𝐶 ∗ = {
9𝛼(1−11𝛼+4𝛼2)
32(1−𝛼)3




0                  ,
1
8




In ODM, in the second stage of the game, the manufacturer chooses 𝑞𝑂. 
No matter what 𝑞𝑂 it chooses, in the high state, the retailer will always choose 𝑝𝑂 = 𝜃𝐻𝑞
𝑂 =
𝑞𝑂, so the manufacturer has profit: 
𝜋𝑀
𝑂 = (𝑤𝑂 − 𝑞𝑂
2
) 𝛼 s.t. 𝑞𝑂 = 𝑝𝑂 ≥ 𝑤𝑂. 
In the low state, recall that the retailer will sell the product to everyone instead of only high-
valuation consumers if 
𝑞𝑂
4




If the manufacturer chooses 𝑞𝑂 ≥
4(1−𝛼)𝑤𝑂
1−4𝛼
, it will have profit: 
𝜋𝑀
𝑂 = 𝑤𝑂 − 𝑞𝑂
2




To maximize its profit, the manufacturer will choose 𝑞𝑂 =
4(1−𝛼)𝑤𝑂
1−4𝛼




















If the manufacturer chooses 𝑞𝑂 <
4(1−𝛼)𝑤𝑂
1−4𝛼
, it will have profit: 
𝜋𝑀
𝑂 = (𝑤𝑂 − 𝑞𝑂
2
) 𝛼 s.t. 𝑞𝑂 ≥ 𝑤𝑂. 
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To maximize its profit, the manufacturer will choose 𝑞𝑂 = 𝑤𝑂, and its expected profit is: 
𝜋𝑀
𝑂 = (𝑤𝑂 − 𝑤𝑂
2
) 𝛼. 




















) 𝛼 ≥ (𝑤𝑂 − 𝑤𝑂
2




In the first stage of the game, the retailer chooses wholesale price. 
If the retailer chooses 𝑤𝑂 >
1−9𝛼+24𝛼2−16𝛼3
16−18𝛼−16𝛼3
, the manufacturer will choose 𝑞𝑂 = 𝑤𝑂, which 
gives the retailer profit 𝜋𝑅
𝑂 = (𝑝𝑂 − 𝑤𝑂)𝛼 = (𝑞𝑂 − 𝑞𝑂)𝛼 = 0. 
If the retailer chooses 0 < 𝑤𝑂 ≤
1−9𝛼+24𝛼2−16𝛼3
16−18𝛼−16𝛼3
, the manufacturer will choose 𝑞𝑂 =
4(1−𝛼)𝑤𝑂
1−4𝛼





















To maximize its profit, the retailer would choose 𝑤𝑂 =
1−9𝛼+24𝛼2−16𝛼3
16−18𝛼−16𝛼3












The retailer would choose ODM over CM if 𝜋𝑅
𝑂∗ > 𝜋𝑅
𝐶 ∗. If 
1
8






𝑂∗. If 0 < 𝛼 <
1
8















(−8 + 163𝛼 − 41𝛼2 −
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316𝛼3 + 8𝛼4 + 32𝛼5). 
Note that when 0 < 𝛼 <
1
8
(11 − √105) , we have 𝛼 > 0 , (1 − 𝛼)3 > 0 , and 8 − 9𝛼 −
8𝛼3 > 0, so the sign of Δ𝜋∗  depends on that of −8 + 163𝛼 − 41𝛼2 − 316𝛼3 + 8𝛼4 + 32𝛼5 , 
whose derivative over 𝛼 is: 
𝑑(−8 + 163𝛼 − 41𝛼2 − 316𝛼3 + 8𝛼4 + 32𝛼5)
𝑑𝛼
 
= 163 − 82𝛼 − 948𝛼2 + 32𝛼3 + 160𝛼4 
> 163 − 82 (
1
8









(2689√105 − 26379) 
= 146.8813 > 0. 




√105) , −8 + 163𝛼 − 41𝛼2 − 316𝛼3 + 8𝛼4 + 32𝛼5 =
9
16
(101√105 − 1023) = 6.7173 > 0 . 
Since −8 + 163𝛼 − 41𝛼2 − 316𝛼3 + 8𝛼4 + 32𝛼5  increases with 𝛼 , there must exist 𝛼∗  such 
that when 0 < 𝛼 < 𝛼∗ , Δ𝜋∗ < 0 ; when 𝛼∗ < 𝛼 <
1
8








𝐶 ∗ = 0 < 𝜋𝑅
𝑂∗ so Δ𝜋∗ > 0. Therefore, there exists 𝛼∗ such that 
𝜋𝑅
𝐶 ∗ > 𝜋𝑅
𝑂∗ if 0 < 𝛼 < 𝛼∗, and 𝜋𝑅
𝐶 ∗ < 𝜋𝑅




Note that demand uncertainty is lower when 𝛼 is larger, so the retailer is better off with ODM 
when demand uncertainty is low. 
A.2.6 Analysis of Return Policy: 
We can see the effects of the return policy with two extreme cases. 
If 𝜌 = 0, then the game is the same as the core model in which there is no return policy. In 
121 
 
this case, the result is the same: the retailer is better off with ODM when demand uncertainty is 
low. 
If 𝜌 = 1, then the retailer can return any unsold products at the wholesale price and does not 
have to bear the risk of overstocking. The retailor will always order an amount that can cover the 
demand in both states, and the game is the same as that in the benchmark case, in which there is 
no demand uncertainty. In this case, the retailer is always better off with ODM. 
Hence, with the return policy, if 𝜌 is low, the result is the same as that in the core model; if 𝜌 
is high, the retailer is always better off with ODM.  
